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ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION*
Michael F. Urbanski**
I. INTRODUCTION
In this past year, as in previous years, Virginia courts have im-
posed strict requirements on plaintiffs bringing antitrust claims.
While antitrust claims remain popular, many have foundered be-
cause the plaintiff either failed to show the existence of an anti-
trust conspiracy or antitrust injury, or the plaintiff inadequately
defined the market allegedly affected by the antitrust violation.
The courts' exacting scrutiny extends beyond the elements of the
action itself to procedural rules, evidentiary requirements and rem-
edies. While one Fourth Circuit case suggests a slight relaxation in
the analysis of state action immunity, the apparent adoption of the
"market screen" analysis in the Fourth Circuit imposes a threshold
burden on private plaintiffs of showing that the defendant has
market power.
II. FEDERAL CIVIL ACTIONS
A. Sherman Act Section 1 Conspiracy Issues
With one exception, the federal courts in Virginia have consist-
ently rejected antitrust conspiracy claims. In the one case in which
such a claim survived, the Fourth Circuit expressed its characteris-
tic unwillingness to disturb a jury verdict.
* This article addresses legislation from the 1989 Session of the General Assembly and
federal antitrust enforcement efforts and decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the state and federal courts of Virginia from
June, 1989 to June, 1990.
** Partner, Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, Roanoke, Virginia; A.B., 1978, College of Wil-
liam and Mary; J. D., 1981, University of Virginia. The author is Secretary of the Antitrust
Section of the Virginia State Bar. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his
colleague Francis H. Casola, as well as that of Timothy Hrynick, Marshall-Wythe School of
Law, College of William and Mary, Class of 1991, in the creation of this article. The author
also acknowledges and appreciates the assistance of Frank Seales, Jr., Senior Assistant At-
torney General, and James P. Wheeler, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust and Consumer
Litigation Section, Commonwealth of Virginia, Office of Attorney General, for information
regarding Virginia state antitrust enforcement actions.
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1. Cases Involving the Manufacturer/Dealer Relationship
Antitrust actions filed by terminated dealers face little prospect
of success following the United States Supreme Court's pronounce-
ments in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.,' Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp,2 and Business Elec-
tronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,3 and the Fourth Circuit's
opinions in Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington Industries,
Inc.,4 National Marine Electronic Distributors, Inc. v. Raytheon
Co.,5 and Garment District, Inc. v. Belk Stores Services, Inc.6
Now, in order to survive summary judgment on a Sherman Act
section 1 claim,7 a terminated dealer must meet a rigid standard,
providing evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility of inde-
1. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
2. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
3. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
4. 763 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff, a carpet retailer, brought suit against
Eatman's, a competitor, and Lee's, its supplier, alleging a conspiracy in violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act stemming from Lee's termination of Terry's as a distributor.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit followed Monsanto, holding that a conspir-
acy is not established by proof that a manufacturer terminated a distributor following, or
even in response to, complaints by other dealers. Id. at 611.
5. 778 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1985). In Raytheon, the Fourth Circuit held that there was suffi-
cient evidence to prove that other dealers made complaints to Raytheon about plaintiff
dealer National, and that they even threatened to cease doing business with Raytheon if it
did not terminate its relationship with National. Id. at 191. The court further found that
Raytheon's decision to terminate National as a dealer was made in the context of these
complaints and that the complaints played a part in the decision. Id. at 192. Nevertheless,
the court held that this was insufficient to prove a conspiracy to restrain retail price
competition:
Permitting an agreement to be inferred merely from the existence of complaints, or
even from the fact that termination came about "in response to" complaints, could
deter or penalize perfectly legitimate conduct. . .. To bar a manufacturer from act-
ing solely because the information upon which it acts originated as a price complaint
would create an irrational dislocation in the market.
Id. at 193 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)); see also
White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98, 102 (4th Cir. 1987).
6. 799 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1986). In Garment District, the Fourth Circuit, relying on Mon-
santo and Raytheon, held that a large distributor may apply certain pressure to its manu-
facturer to terminate its relationship with another distributor without violating § 1 of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 909. Garment District, a discount distributor, claimed that Belk, a large
competitor operating 200 stores, had coerced the manufacturer into terminating Garment
District's distributorship by threatening to discontinue the manufacturer's line of clothing.
Id. at 907. The court rejected this claim, stating that without more, a manufacturer's termi-
nation of a discounting distributor in response to Belk's claim is insufficient to prove an
illegal price fixing conspiracy. Id. at 911.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988) provides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
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pendent action" and "that reasonably tends to prove . . . a con-
scious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an
unlawful objective."8 In applying this standard, the Supreme Court
held that a conspiracy cannot be inferred merely from the com-
plaints of other distributors to the manufacturer and the subse-
quent termination of the distributor: "To permit the inference of
concerted action on the basis of receiving complaints alone and
thus to expose the defendant to treble damage liability would both
inhibit management's exercise of its independent business judg-
ment and emasculate the terms of the statute."9
In 1989, the Fourth Circuit continued this trend by rejecting
three attacks on a manufacturer's use of territorial restrictions on
the sale of its products, affirming the district court's denial of relief
to the dealer in each case. Parkway Gallery Furniture v. Kit-
tinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc.'0 was the first of two opin-
ions written by Judge Sprouse in 1989 regarding challenges by dis-
count furniture retailers to changes in manufacturers' sales policies
that prohibited extraterritorial sales. In Parkway, Pennsylvania
House, the manufacturer, adopted changes in its retail marketing
policy prohibiting dealers from soliciting or selling its furniture by
mail or telephone to customers residing outside specified areas of
retail responsibility." The policy change resulted from complaints
by other Pennsylvania House dealers throughout the country that
they were losing sales to North Carolina discount dealers. 2 Penn-
sylvania House discussed the new policy with its dealers both
before and after the policy was implemented. 3 Feedback from the
dealers was favorable, including responses that they "totally
agree," "will abide totally," or that they were willing to "come
around."' 4 Other dealers informed plaintiff's customers of the pol-
icy change and one Pennsylvania House dealer notified Pennsylva-
nia House of a policy violation and sought enforcement. 5
Based on these allegations, plaintiff North Carolina furniture
discounters alleged a per se unlawful price fixing conspiracy and a
8. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 768.
9. Id. at 764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111
n.2 (3rd Cir. 1980)).
10. 878 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1989).
11. Id. at 802.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 802-03.
15. Id.
1990]
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conspiracy in restraint of trade between Pennsylvania House and
some of its dealers.'8 After highlighting the holdings of the Su-
preme Court in Monsanto and Matsushita, Judge Sprouse cited
Garment District for the proposition that "[tihis Court has simi-
larly been sensitive to Monsanto's requirement that there be clear
evidence of concerted activity.' 1 7 The North Carolina discounters
first argued that Monsanto "does not apply to nonprice restriction
claims because the Supreme Court intended the Monsanto condi-
tions to serve as a breakwater against the harsh effects of the per
se rule in price fixing cases." 18 Judge Sprouse rejected this conten-
tion, noting that he did "not discern such a limiting intent in the
Monsanto opinion,"' 9 and held that "the rules laid down in Mon-
santo and Matsushita are not restricted to price-fixing cases, and
we thus conclude that something more than a bare complaint and
a response to it is necessary to support an inference of a conspiracy
in a nonprice restriction claim."20
Judge Sprouse also rejected the discounters' second argument
that the facts alleged provided the "something more" required by
Monsanto, reasoning that "[a]ny evidentiary fact may support a
wide range of inferences, but the discrete inferences necessary
under Monsanto to support a conspiracy theory simply do not flow
. .. [from the evidence] that Pennsylvania House sought assur-
ances from its dealers that they would comply with its new mar-
keting policy."'21 In so ruling, the court expressly disagreed with
recent opinions of the Eighth2 2 and Eleventh Circuits, 3 holding
that dealer termination and/or discipline, coupled with communi-
cations by a manufacturer to a complaining dealer to the effect
that "the problem has been taken care of ' 24 or "corrective action
has been taken,25 satisfied Monsanto. Judge Sprouse explained
that, "In our view, however, those decisions have in effect miscon-
strued 'tends. to exclude the possibility' of independent conduct
16. Id.
17. Id. at 804.
18. Id. at 805.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 806.
22. McCabe's Furniture, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 798 F.2d 323, 328 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988).
23. Helicopter Support Sys. v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 818 F.2d 1530, 1535-36 n.6 (11th
Cir. 1987).
24. McCabe's Furniture, 798 F.2d at 328.
25. Helicopter Support Sys., 818 F.2d at 1535.
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. . . to mean something like 'arguably consistent with the possibil-
ity of a conspiracy.' "26
In his second opinion rejecting dealers' challenges of territorial
restraints imposed by furniture manufacturers, Judge Sprouse, in
Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus-
tries, Inc. ,2' 7 affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary in-
junction to fifteen plaintiff North Carolina furniture retailers.2 8
Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief from the imposition by Thomas-
ville Furniture of a new sales policy limiting out of state sales simi-
lar to the Pennsylvania House policy at issue in Parkway.29
Employing the four-prong preliminary injunction test set forth
in Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Seilig Manufacturing Co.,30 the
Fourth Circuit denied injunctive relief, reasoning that the balance
of harms weighed in favor of the manufacturer, that the retailers
failed to establish a strong showing of probable success and that
the evidence presented did not indicate that the public interest
supported entry of the injunction.31 Assessing the balance of harms
in the case, the court pointed out that damage to plaintiffs' cus-
tomer goodwill was limited because plaintiffs could continue to fill
customer orders at their showrooms. 32 Also, plaintiffs obviously
were not struggling for survival given that total sales of Thomas-
ville's furniture, only some of which were eliminated by Thomas-
ville's new policy, constituted only seventeen percent of plaintiffs'
total sales. 3 Noting that a strong showing of probable success
could counteract a weak showing as to the balance of harms, the
court went on to assess the retailers' likelihood of success on the
merits.34 The Fourth Circuit recognized that because vertical non-
price restraints are subject to analysis under the rule of reason,35 a
threshold consideration is whether the defendant had market
26. 878 F.2d at 806 n.4 (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588).
27. 889 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1989).
28. Id. at 530.
29. Id. at 525.
30. 550 F.2d 189, 196 (4th Cir. 1977).
31. Murrow, 889 F.2d at 527-28.
32. Id. at 526.
33. Id. at 527.
34. Id. at 527.
35. The Fourth Circuit quoted from Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49
(1977), that under the rule of reason, "the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a
case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unrea-
sonable restraint on competition." Id.
1990]
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power.36 Finding that the retailers utterly failed to define a rele-
vant product or geographic market, the court concluded that no
showing of market power could be established. Adopting a version
of the "market power screen" threshold test employed by several
circuits, 7 the Fourth Circuit concluded its analysis, holding that
"a finding of no market power precludes any need to further bal-
ance the competitive effects of a challenged restraint."38
Finally, in Purity Products, Inc. v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts &
Co.,3 9 plaintiff, a distributor of food products in the Washington/
Baltimore market, challenged its termination as an authorized
wholesale distributor of Tropicana products.40 The termination
arose as a result of Purity's extraterritorial sales in the New York
area in which Tropicana operated its own sales force.41 Tropicana
justified its policy of selling only to wholesalers who agree to geo-
graphically restrict their sales as a means of ensuring the quality of
its perishable products and proper allocation of its promotional
and advertising allowances.42 In its per curiam opinion, the Fourth
Circuit ruled that there was insufficient evidence of concerted ac-
tivity to sustain the antitrust claims.43
36. Id. at 528 (citing Valley Liquors v. Renfield Importers, 822 F.2d 656, 666 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977 (1987)); accord Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp.,
483 F. Supp. 750, 761 (D. Md. 1980), aff'd, 683 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864
(1981). Cf. Military Serv. Realty v. Realty Consultants, 823 F.2d 8239, 832 (4th Cir. 1987).
37. Under this approach, "courts have narrowed the unlimited inquiry necessary under
the rule of reason by requiring at the threshold that the plaintiff attacking a vertical non-
price restraint prove the defendant's substantial power in a relevant market." Assam Drug
Co., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., Inc., 798 F.2d 311, 315-16 (8th Cir. 1986). See, e.g., Rothery
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986); General
Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1984); Graphic
Products Distributors, Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1568-69 (11th Cir. 1983); Davis-
Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, sub
nom. Service Merchandise Co. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 466 U.S. 931 (1984); Valley
Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982); Muenster Bu-
tane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir, 1981); O.S.C. Corp. v. Apple Computer,
Inc., 601 F.Supp. 1274, 1291 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1986).
38. Id. at 529; See Satellite Television & Associated Resources v. Continental Cablevision
of Virginia, 714 F.2d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984).
39. No. 89-2322 (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1989).
40. Id.
41. Id., slip op. at 3.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 5.
468
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2. Other Sherman Act Conspiracy Cases
Hospital staff privilege cases have fared little better with the
Fourth Circuit then have dealer termination cases. The court sum-
marily rejected appeals of two dismissals of hospital staff privilege
cases in 1989. In a per curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
Judge Glen Williams' dismissal of a black physician's antitrust
conspiracy ana civil rights claims against three southwest Virginia
hospitals arising out of the termination of his hospital privileges. 4
In similar fashion, the court also summarily rejected a challenge to
the district court's disposal of an Indian anesthesiologist's anti-
trust and civil rights claims on summary judgment.4" While a panel
of the court initially reversed the district court's dismissal, the full
court granted appellee's petition for rehearing en banc, which is
presently pending. 46
In Tempkin v. Lewis-Gale Hospital, Inc.,47 the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia once again re-
jected the application of the antitrust laws to hospital staff issues,
disposing of a physician's antitrust action against a hospital and
multispecialty clinic, ruling that the amended complaint was insuf-
ficient to state an antitrust claim. In Tempkin, a psychiatrist and
his nurse-practitioner wife brought a Sherman Act suit alleging a
conspiracy to remove him as medical director of a hospital-based
rehabilitation unit, and further alleging administrative delays and
policies designed to prevent husband and wife from working to-
gether.48 Judge Turk dismissed the section 1 claim pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because
plaintiffs failed to make any allegations regarding the hospital's
44. Thompson v. Wise Community Hosp., No. 89-2055 (4th Cir. Jan. 30, 1990). This dis-
trict court opinion was discussed in Urbanski, Antitrust Law: Annual Survey of Virginia
Law, 23 U. RicH. L. REv. 455, 466 (1989). Thompson is significant, of course, for Judge
Williams' interpretation of the second prong of the McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orle-
ans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232 (1980), jurisdictional test, requiring antitrust plaintiffs to prove that
the substantial effect on interstate commerce flows from the antitrust violation, rather than
the general business activity of the alleged antitrust violators.
45. Purnima M. Shah v. Memorial Hosp., 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 2912 (4th Cir. May
22, 1989). The district court opinion was discussed in Urbanski, supra note 44, at 473-74.
Purnima M. Shah is significant in the hospital staff privileges context because it authorized,
pursuant to Monsanto and Matsushita, the grant of summary judgment based on a showing
that the adverse credentialling activity was founded upon documented concerns regarding
the practitioner's competency.
46. Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hosp., 912 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1990).
47. 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,865 (W.D. Va. 1989).
48. Id.
1990]
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market power or injury to competition.49
The Fourth Circuit addressed Sherman Act conspiracy issues in
two other cases. In Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills,
Inc.,50 competing commercial photographers appealed from the
district court's entry of summary judgment denying their claims
under section 1 of the Sherman Act alleging that two competing
commercial photographers had conspired with local high schools to
restrain trade in the high school yearbook and portrait photogra-
phy markets. Plaintiffs alleged that the two defendant commercial
photographers contracted with all twenty-two high schools in the
Norfolk area to photograph students for school yearbooks.5 1 Under
the contracts, the photographers took student yearbook pictures
and paid the schools a percentage of profits earned on optional stu-
dent portrait photographs.52  After the photographs were taken,
both the schools and the photographer sent letters to students and
parents encouraging portrait purchases and disclosing that a per-
centage of the profits would be returned to the school.53 The mar-
keting system of coordinating the yearbook pictures and portraits,
coupled with the school's endorsement, gave the two contracting
photographers a competitive advantage in selling portraits. 4
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia determined that the plaintiffs had not met their burden
under Monsanto, and consequently granted summary judgment on
the section 1 conspiracy claim.55 On appeal, the Fourth Court af-
firmed, rejecting the assertions that plaintiffs' Monsanto burden
had been satisfied. 5e The district court held that the record did not
support an inference of conspiracy between the schools and com-
peting photographers to exclude plaintiffs from the competitive
contract negotiation process because plaintiffs had only made a to-
ken effort to negotiate contracts with area high schools.57 Further,
it held that the schools' endorsement letters did not indicate a con-
spiracy, but rather were "readily explainable as legitimate acts
49. Id. at 62,552.
50. 903 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1990).
51. Id. at 990.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 713 F. Supp. 937, 947-48 (E.D. Va. 1989).
56. 903 F.2d at 996.
57. Id. at 995.
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ANTITRUST LAW
consistent with their contractual responsibilities." ' s
In Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Adver-
tising, Inc.,59 the only case in which an alleged antitrust conspiracy
was found to exist, plaintiff billboard company sued its rival and
the City of Columbia, South Carolina, alleging violations of sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 0 It claimed that city ordinances
preventing Omni from constructing billboards in areas where
Omni's competitor, Columbia Outdoor Advertising ("COA"), al-
ready had billboards were passed as a result of a conspiracy be-
tween COA and the City of Columbia. 1
Following a jury verdict for Omni, the district court granted de-
fendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on
the grounds that Parker v. Brown12 state action immunity barred
the action against the city. The Fourth Circuit first overruled the
district court, invoking the conspiracy exception,63 and then pro-
ceeded to assess plaintiff's evidence of a conspiracy, which in-
cluded a history of ordinances that protected COA's dominant po-
sition in the market and evidence that COA had provided free
political billboards to the mayor and key city councilmen. 4 The
court noted that while COA and the city advanced neutral, non-
competitive reasons for the adoption of the ordinances,
[tiheir problem on appeal, however, is that the jury heard all of the
evidence and was required to examine the evidence in its entirety,
discarding whatever evidence it considered unreliable and giving
weight to all it considered credible. In that important context, and
when viewed in the light most favorable to Omni, the evidence tends
"to exclude the possibility" that the City and COA acted indepen-
dently. Rather, it tends to prove that the City and COA "had a con-
scious commitment to a common scheme" designed to stifle compe-
tition and preserve COA's monopoly.65
58. Id. (citing White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98, 102 (4th Cir. 1987)).
The court noted that plaintiffs had apparently abandoned their exclusive dealing claim
based on the contracts as "they neither explained to the district court how the contracts
operated to restrain trade nor stressed this point on appeal." Id.
59. 891 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 3211 (June 18, 1990).
60. Id. at 1129.
61. Id. at 1130.
62. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
63. Omni, 891 F.2d at 1132. The Omni court's state action immunity analysis is discussed
in Section II of the opinion.
64. Id. at 891 F.2d at 1132-37.
65. Id. at 1136 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
588 (1986); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984)).
1990]
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Certiori was granted in Omni. It is one of only two antitrust cases
to be heard by the United States Supreme Court for the October
Term, 1990.
B. Sherman Act Section 2 Monopolization Issues6s
Monopolization issues were addressed by the Virginia federal
courts on motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which, by and large, was a successful de-
fensive tactic. Perhaps motions to dismiss are successful in cases
involving section 2 of the Sherman Act because of the myriad of
elements developed in the case law that constitute each offense,67
and because of the reluctance on the part of the courts to expend
significant judicial resources on claims which simply make no eco-
nomic sense. 8
For example, the trial courts in Official Airline Guides, Inc. v.
American Society of Travel Agents, Inc.,e9 Tempkin v. Lewis-Gale
Hospital, Inc.,7 0 Spire Corp. v. International Telephone & Tele-
graph Corp.71 and General Medical Corp. v. Wyngarden 2 dis-
missed Sherman Act section 2 allegations for plaintiffs' failure to
state a claim. In Official Airline Guides, Judge Bryan considered
"implausible" plaintiff's claims that the relevant product market
consisted only of the annual meeting of defendant trade associa-
66. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) provides: "Every person who shall monopolize; or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony. .. ."
67. To prevail on a monopolization claim, plaintiff must allege that the defendants: (1)
possess monopoly power in a particular relevant market; (2) have willfully acquired and/or
maintained such power; and (3) that such acts have resulted in antitrust injury. Catlin v.
Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343, 1347 (9th Cir. 1986); Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc.,
669 F. Supp. 998, 1022 (E.D. Cal. 1987). To assert a claim of attempted monopolization,
plaintiff must allege: (1) that the defendants had a specific intent to monopolize a relevant
market; and (2) that a dangerous probability of success in monopolization exists. White Bag
Co. v. Int'l Paper Co., 579 F.2d 1384, 1387 (4th Cir. 1974); Satellite Television & Associated
Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision of Virginia, 714 F.2d 351, 358 (4th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984). A claim for conspiracy to monopolize must allege: (1) a
conspiracy; (2) overt acts in furtherance of this conspiracy; (3) a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce; and (4) a specific intent to monopolize. See also Hospital Building Co. v.
Trustees of Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 890, 904 (1983).
68. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
69. No. 89-1114-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 8, 1989).
70. 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,865 (W.D. Va. 1989).
71. No. 88-0271-R (W.D. Va. Oct. 3, 1989) (mem. op.).
72. No. HA-98-3 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. Apr. 20, 1990).
1990] ANTITRUST LAW
tion and dismissed the action.73 In Tempkin, Judge Turk dis-
missed the section 2 claims on jurisdictional grounds, ruling that
plaintiffs' amended complaint lacked allegations of a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. 4 Noting that "[t]he burden of proof
is upon plaintiff to allege sufficient facts which would establish an
antitrust violation if proved, ' 75 Judge Turk recognized that "plain-
tiffs' antitrust allegations are mere conclusions and a recitation of
the statutory language and are, therefore, insufficient to withstand
a motion to dismiss. '76 Similarly, in Spire, Judge Turk found
plaintiffs' section 2 allegations to be "no more than a recitation of
statutory language and are insufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss. "'77 Judge Turk noted that plaintiff failed to allege facts
supporting the conclusion that defendant possessed monopoly
power, that it willfully acquired and/or maintained such power,
and that the alleged violation resulted in antitrust injury.78 Judge
Turk went beyond these pleading deficiencies and held that plain-
tiff's allegations merely constituted vertical expansion79 and breach
of contract, but did not constitute a predatory act rising to the
level of violating section 2 of the Sherman Act.8 0 In Wyngarden,
73. Official Airline Guides, No. 89-1114-A, slip op. at 19.
74. Tempkin, 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 68,865 at 62,552. Judge Turk held that the mere
recitation that the antitrust violations have occurred "in and through interstate commerce"
were conclusory allegations failing to state a claim. Id. at 62,550. Judge Turk held that
plaintiffs' allegations amounted to "purely personal complaints regarding their individual
inability to work where and how they prefer, their reduced income, and Dr. Tempkin's in-
ability to obtain malpractice insurance at favorable rates." Id. The court noted further that
there was no allegation that a significant number of Dr. Tempkin's patients came from
outside of Virginia or that the alleged antitrust violation prevented Dr. Tempkin from treat-
ing them as he continued to practice physiatry in Roanoke. Id. While plaintiff alleged that,
as a result of the alleged anticompetitive conduct, patients were referred to another Roa-
noke practitioner, the court correctly noted that even if those allegations were true, there
"would be no gain or loss in the number of patients affecting interstate commerce." Id.
75. Id. at 62,551 (citing Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. No-Car Driveway, Inc., 691 F.2d 241 (6th
Cir. 1982)).
76. Tempkin, 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 62.551 (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1054 (1985)); Reynolds Metals Co.
v. Columbia Gas System, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Va. 1987).
77. Spire, No. 88-0271-R, mem. op. at 4.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2nd Cir. 1979)).
80. Spire, mem. op. at 5. As was the case in Tempkin, Judge Turk also dismissed the
complaint in Spire for lack of antitrust standing. In each case, citing Volasco Products Co.
v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing, 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 907 (1963),
Judge Turk held that plaintiffs alleged injury was too far removed from any injury to com-
petition. In Tempkin, for example, plaintiff psychiatrist alleged that the relevant product
market was "comprehensive acute inpatient rehabilitation medicine" which required a hos-
pital setting and which plaintiffs alone could not provide. Tempkin, 1989-2 Trade Cas.
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the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond likewise sustained a
demurrer to an attempted monopolization claim when the cross-
bill made only a passing reference to the relevant market and con-
tained no allegations as to the defendant's specific intent, market
power or to a dangerous probability of success.8
In contrast with its strict approach in the cases described above,
the Fourth Circuit in Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomas-
ville Furniture Industries, Inc., reversed and remanded the lower
court's dismissal of Sherman Act section 2 claims for the "unprece-
dented prolixity" of plaintiff's forty page complaint and plaintiff's
failure to allege specific intent to monopolize.8 3 Citing the "rigor-
ous standard on dismissals" of antitrust cases imposed by the Su-
preme Court in Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospi-
tal,"4 the Fourth Circuit held that the district court abused its
(CCH) 68,865 at 62,551. Finding that plaintiffs were neither competitors nor consumers in
the product market alleged, Judge Turk reasoned that standing was lacking. Id. In Spire,
plaintiff was a supplier of photocathodes, a component part of the night vision optics manu-
factured by defendants. Defendant's rejection of plaintiff's photocathodes gave rise to the
antitrust allegations; Spire contended that the rejection was designed to drive it from the
market. Denying standing, Judge Turk held that "Itihe allegations in plaintiff's complaint
establish that Spire, a supplier of component parts, is in a position too remote and too far
removed from any injury to competition in ITT's market to recover damages resulting from
any claimed violation of the antitrust laws in the night vision products market." Spire,
mem. op. at 3.
81. Wyngarden, No. HA-98-3 at 1.
82. 889 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1989).
83. See White Bag Co. v. International Paper Co., 579 F.2d 1384, 1387 (4th Cir. 1974).
84. 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976). In Rex, the court stated:
We have held that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim which would entitle him to relief." And in antitrust cases, where "the
proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators," dismissals prior to giving
the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be granted very sparingly.
Id. at 746 (citations omitted).
Of course, Rex was decided ten years before the summary judgment trilogy of Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), and
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574 (1986), in the heyday of Poller v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464 (1962), (holding that summary judgment
should be used infrequently in antitrust cases). While, of course, the 1986 decisions are Rule
56 rather than Rule 12(b)(6) decisions, given the staggering cost of antitrust discovery, one
questions whether the § 2 reversal inappropriately elevates procedure over substance by
allowing plaintiffs to amend their § 2 claim following the court's finding that defendant
Thomasville had no market power as it sold less than three percent of the wood furniture
and one percent of the upholstered furniture in the relevant geographic market. Perhaps the
reversal can be explained more readily by the district court's failure to provide any explana-
tion for its denial of leave to amend. Murrow, 889 F.2d at 529-530. By contrast, Judge Turk
in Tempkin denied plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint a second time, find-
ing that as the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, a second amendment would be futile
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discretion by refusing to allow plaintiff the opportunity to cure the
pleading deficiencies by amendment.8 5
Finally, in Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc.,"8
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's allegation
that two competing commercial photographers had conspired to
monopolize the high school student portrait market in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiff's evidence of a per se hori-
zontal price fixing conspiracy between the two successful compa-
nies consisted of the presence of one company's price list in the
files of the other and virtually identical prices.8 7 While recognizing
that United States v. Container Corp.8 8 invalidated an agreement
to exchange current price information upon request, the court held
that:
The record before us does not support an inference that appellees
agreed to share price information. The fact that the price informa-
tion about one company is found in a competitor's files or an em-
ployee reports a competitor's pricing policy to his home office and
the two companies charge similar prices for their products, without
more, cannot support an inference that the two competitors entered
into an agreement to share prices. To successfully raise an inference
that two competitors agreed to share price information, a complain-
ant must produce some evidence which tends to exclude the possi-
bility that the competitors acted independently. Here, the record
supports only the conclusion that there was no agreement, informal
or otherwise, to exchange price information and Olan Mills obtained
the price list without the knowledge or approval of Kinder-Care. 8
The court summarily rejected plaintiff's allegation of per se hori-
zontal market allocation, ruling that "neither in the district court
nor on appeal did appellants offer any support for this
allegation."90
and inappropriate under Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
85. Murrow, 889 F.2d at 529-30.
86. 903 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1990).
87. Id. at 995.
88. 393 U.S. 333, 334-45 (1969).
89. Stephen Jay Photography, 903 F.2d at 996.
90. Id.
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C. Mergers and Acquisitions
In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit rejected a novel
challenge by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
and affirmed the celebrated judgment of the United States District
Court for the Western District of Virginia allowing two Roanoke
hospitals to affiliate.9 1 The Fourth Circuit's opinion was the first
time that a circuit court of appeals considered the merger of non-
profit hospitals.92 Assessing the district court's opinion under the
"clearly erroneous" standard, the Fourth Circuit affirmed both
91. United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,859 (4th Cir.
1989). The district court opinion is discussed in Urbanski, supra note 44, at 480-82.
92. The Seventh Circuit rejected the acquisition by a for-profit hospital chain of two hos-
pitals in Chattanooga, Tennessee in Hosp. Corp. of America v. Federal Trade Commission,
807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1981). See also In re American Medical Int'l, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 22,170 (F.T.C. 1984) (where the FTC invalidated a California hospital acquisition).
In a companion case to Carilion, United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d
1278 (7th Cir. 1990), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of a non-
profit hospital merger in Rockford, Illinois pursuant to § 7 of the Clayton Act.
In Rockford, the district court ruled that § 7 of the Clayton Act was applicable to non-
profit entities and enjoined the proposed hospital merger. The Seventh Circuit expressed
reluctance to address the question of the application of § 7 of the Clayton Act because it
believed that the jurisdiction of the FTC (upon which the scope of § 7 is based) was prop-
erly delineated in § 11 of the Clayton Act rather than § 4 of the Clayton Act as contended
by the government. Because the reference to the jurisdiction of the FTC under § 11 of the
Clayton Act was not argued (and thus waived), the court expressly declined the invitation to
rule on the applicability of § 7 to non-profit entities. While expressly declining to rule, how-
ever, the court expressed in dicta that it believed that § 7 of the Clayton Act applies to non-
profit mergers by reference to § 11 of the Clayton Act. Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1281. The
court nevertheless determined that there is no substantive difference between judging the
lawfulness of a merger under § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. Finding
that the district court correctly defined the relevant market, the court found an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade resulting solely from "immense shares in a reasonably defined market"
reviewed under the deferential "clearly erroneous" standard. Id. at 1285. The court con-
cluded that:
The principles of civil procedure do not require that the plaintiff make an airtight
case, only that his case satisfy some minimum threshold of persuasiveness and be
better than the defendant's case. The government showed large market shares in a
plausibly defined market in an industry more prone than many to collusion. The de-
fendants responded with conjectures about the motives of nonprofits, and other will
o' the wisps, that the district judge was free to reject, and did. The judge's findings
establish a violation of section 1 under the standards of Columbia Steel, and the
judgment must therefore be affirmed without our needing to decide whether the dis-
trict judge was correct in holding that section 7 does reach mergers between nonprofit
corporations.
Id. at 1286. The Seventh Circuit rejected the Fourth Circuit's decision in Carilion primarily
due to its brevity and unpublished status and Judge Turk's opinion because of its ostensible
inconsistency with its own opinion in Hospital Corporation of America. Differences between
the Rockford and Carilion cases are discussed in Poff, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Study
of the Roanoke and Rockford Decisions, 6(9) Hosp. L. Newsl. 1 (1989).
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Judge Turk's market definition93 and his conclusion that under the
rule of reason, the affiliation would not result in an unreasonable
restraint of trade. 4 The court also upheld the district court's find-
ing that the accumulation of a larger market share does not pre-
sumptively lead to anticompetitive effects in the relevant market. 5
In reaching this conclusion, the court cited substantial competitive
pressure from the excess capacity of existing hospital competitors
and outpatient alternatives and the substantial savings to be gen-
erated by the merger.9 6 Prior to trial, Judge Turk had granted
summary judgment, rejecting the government's claim under section
7 of the Clayton Act, and ruling that as nonprofit corporations are
beyond the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"),
section 7 is inapplicable to mergers of nonstock, nonprofit enti-
tiesY7 While the government maintained that in United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank,95 the United States Supreme Court
interpreted section 7 to apply to all mergers, the Fourth Circuit
declined to address that issue as the government took the position,
relying on United States v. First National Bank of Lexington,99
that there was no analytical distinction between Sherman Act sec-
tion 1 claims and Clayton Act section 7 claims.100
D. Price Discrimination
The United States Supreme Court has decided that not every
functional discount'' asserted in defense of a price discrimination
93. See infra text accompanying notes 165-189 for analysis of market definition issues.
94. Carilion, 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,859.
95. Id. at 62,526.
96. Id.
97. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, provides that "[n]o person shall acquire
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the juris-
diction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
one or more persons engaged in commerce . . ." where the effect may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
98. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
99. 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
100. Carilion, 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,859 at 62,515 n.1.
101. A "functional discount" is a common business pricing practice. It has been defined
by one court as follows:
A functional discount occurs where a buyer is permitted to purchase a product for a
lower price than another buyer because of the different levels of distribution occupied
by the buyers or because the buyers perform different functions in the seller's mar-
keting system. The primary justification for the discount is to compensate the buyer
for its cost of performing functions ordinarily performed by the seller.
Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 34, 36 (E.D. Wash. 1985), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2535
(1990).
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claim is entitled to a judgment of legitimacy. In Texaco, Inc. v.
Hasbrouck, °2 the Court addressed whether a supplier's functional
discounts to a few of its distributors violated the Robinson-Patman
Act. 03 Texaco sold gasoline directly to respondents and several
other retailers while it granted substantial discounts to two distrib-
utors.'1 4 The two favored distributors did not themselves compete
with respondents; however, they did pass along discounts to cus-
tomers who did.105 During the nine year period at issue, stations
supplied by the two distributors prospered while respondents' sales
suffered. 06
Texaco first argued that a price differential between customers
at different levels of distribution is not "discrimination in price"
within the meaning of the Act. 07 Finding that to hold otherwise
would create a blanket exemption for all functional discounts, the
Court held that price discrimination "is merely a price difference"
and the Act prohibits such price differences offered to wholesalers
and retailers. 0 8
Texaco also argued that, as a seller, it should not be held liable
for the independent pricing decisions of its customers. The Court
generally agreed with the premise of Texaco's argument, noting
that the predicate of functional discounts is a price differential
that recognizes and reimburses the distributor for actual marketing
functions performed for the seller.'09 The Court held, however,
that there simply was no substantial evidence indicating that the
discounts to Texaco's distributors constituted reasonable reim-
bursement for the value to Texaco of their actual marketing
functions. 10
The Fourth Circuit's rejection of two price discrimination cases
perhaps was overshadowed by the Greensboro, North Carolina,
Robinson-Patman Act jury award of $148.8 million in treble dam-
ages in Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp."' While staggering, the verdict was short lived, as the dis-
102. 110 S. Ct. 2535.
103. Id. at 2530-40.
104. Id. at 2538.
105. Id. at 2539.
106. Id. at 2539-40.
107. Id. at 2540.
108. Id. at 2550-51.
109. Id. at 2545.
110. Id. at 2546.
111. No. C-84-617-D (M.D.N.C. Mar. 2, 1990).
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trict court subsequently entered a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict."1 2
In Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc.,"' plain-
tiff commercial photographers contended that the payments of
profits by the contracting school photographer to the school in ex-
change for its status as official school photographer constituted
"commercial bribery" in violation of section 2(c) of the Robinson-
Patman Act.11 4 In this case of first impression in the Fourth Cir-
cuit, the court recognized that the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act
amendments to the Clayton Act' 15 were enacted "to prohibit tac-
tics used by large buyers or sellers to circumvent the discrimina-
tory price provisions of the Clayton Act,"1 such as commercial
bribery and the use of "dummy brokerages" to whom discrimina-
tory payments are made. Analyzing commercial bribery cases from
four circuits and the legislative history of the amendments,11 7 the
Fourth Circuit recognized that only when the "seller-buyer line has
been passed" 1 8 should courts impose section 2(c) liability.119
Plaintiffs suggested that the seller-buyer line was crossed in this
case because the schools acted for the students in contracting for
yearbook photographs. Nevertheless, the court framed the issue as
whether the schools acted as an intermediary for the student buy-
ers for purposes of school portrait sales.1 0 Finding that the schools
had no authority to bind the students regarding portrait sales and
that, as a result, no agency or employment relationship existed be-
tween the students and the school regarding such sales, the court
found that the payments from the contracting official photogra-
phers to the schools did not cross the seller-buyer line, and did not
112. Id. (Aug. 27, 1990), published at 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 360 (Aug.
30, 1990).
113. 903 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1990).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1988).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 12.
116. Stephen Jay Photography, 903 F.2d at 992.
117. See Environmental Tectonics v. W. S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1066 (3d Cir.
1988); af 'd on other grounds, 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990); Grace v. E. J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170
(7th Cir. 1976), abrogation on other grounds recognized, Federal Paper Bd., Co. v. Amata,
693 F. Supp. 1376 (D. Conn. 1988); Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d
851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light &
Power, 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943). But see Seaboard Supply Co. v. Congoleum Corp., 770
F.2d 367, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1985) (questioning the proposition that Congress intended to in-
clude commercial bribery within the ambit of § 2(c)).
118. Seaboard Supply Co., 770 F.2d at 372.
119. Stephen Jay Photography, 903 F.2d at 993.
120. Id.
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result in liability under section 2(c). 2'
The Fourth Circuit also addressed the question of whether a to-
bacco wholesaler's revocation of a distributor's credit violated the
Robinson-Patman Act. In Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard,
Inc.,"' the tobacco wholesaler, Lorillard, appealed from a jury ver-
dict awarding plaintiff monetary and injunctive relief based on a
breach of contract and a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, ruling that the suspension of credit
may constitute a Robinson-Patman violation only in an extreme
situation "of such magnitude or nature as to constitute a viola-
tion."'23 The Fourth Circuit held that except in such extreme cir-
cumstances, decisions involving the extension of credit, as a matter
of law, do not constitute a Robinson-Patman violation because
credit decisions involve a myriad of factors unique to each bor-
rower' 24 and
by their very nature, require constant discrimination between those
who are a good credit risk and those who are not. To avoid Robin-
son-Patman problems in the extension of credit, a manufacturer
must use the same standard of credit worthiness in dealing with all
applicants for credit who are in competition with one another. 125
Dissenting from Judge Chapman's panel opinion, Judge Sprouse
reasoned that in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Catalano,
Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.,26 the credit restrictions imposed by the
cigarette supplier on its wholesalers must be viewed as being
equivalent to a price increase."'
121. Id. The court further rejected the contention that § 11-41(6) of the Code of Virginia
compels the conclusion that the schools act as "purchasing agent" for the students because
the portrait purchase is optional. The court also expressly disagreed with two opinions of
the Virginia Attorney General interpreting a Virginia Antitrust Act provision similar to §
2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act that the schools act as representatives of the students in
connection with school portrait sales. Id.
122. 878 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1989).
123. Id. at 798 (quoting Craig v. Sun Oil Company of Pennsylvania, 515 F.2d 221, 224
(10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839 (1976)).
124. Id. at 797.
125. Id. at 799. Employing this standard, the court noted that the Robinson-Patman Act
was not intended to result in the jury reviewing the reasonableness of a credit decision. "We
are not concerned with the reasonableness of such decisions, but we are concerned with
whether there was unjustified discrimination in extending or withholding credit to compet-
ing purchasers." Id.
126. 446 U.S. 643, 648 (1980).
127. Lorillard, 878 F.2d at 800-01 (Sprouse J., dissenting). The panel's opinion distin-
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E. Group Boycotts
The most important group boycott case this past year was the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in FTC v. Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Association ("SCTLA"). 25 There the Court
addressed whether a group of lawyers who refused to represent in-
digent criminal defendants in order to force an increase in their
compensation violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. One hundred District of Columbia public defenders in the SC-
TLA agreed to refuse new appointments under the District's Crim-
inal Justice Act until they received a "substantial" increase in the
hourly rate paid them by the city. 2 ' Through their group boycott,
they were successful in forcing City Council to pass a bill increas-
ing their rates between five dollars to fifteen dollars per hour. 30
The FTC subsequently filed a complaint against them alleging un-
fair methods of competition and eventually entered a cease-and-
desist order.13
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia vacated the
FTC order and remanded for a determination of whether the SC-
TLA possessed "significant market power."'" 2 While acknowledg-
ing that the boycott represented a classic restraint of trade in vio-
lation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, it concluded that the
boycott contained an element of expression warranting first
amendment protection. 33 Since the lawyers intended to convey a
political message, the court of appeals required the FTC, under
United States v. O'Brien,13 4 to prove, rather than merely presume
under the per se rule, that the SCTLA had market power. 35 The
court stated that the antitrust laws should be applied "prudently
and with sensitivity," with a special solicitude for the lawyers' first
amendment rights.13 6
guished Catalano, in which beer distributors agreed to eliminate short-term trade credit to
retailers, as a horizontal price fixing conspiracy, unrelated to the unilateral conduct under-
taken by Lorillard. Id. at 795-97.
128. 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,895 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1990).
129. Id. at 62,808.
130. Id. at 62,809.
131. Id. 62,809-10.
132. Id. 62,810.
133. Id.
134. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (holding that restrictions on political expression are only justi-
fied when they are no greater than is essential to an important government interest).
135. SCTLA, 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,895 at 62,810.
136. Id. at 62,813.
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The Supreme Court accepted the case in light of the court of
appeals' novel holding. The Supreme Court began its analysis by
noting that it was not its task "to pass upon the social utility or
political wisdom of price-fixing agreements."' 37 As in National So-
ciety of Professional Engineers v. United States,1 8 where the
Court had condemned a boycott despite the fact that it sought a
"reasonable" price, the SCTLA's "naked restraint" on price and
output was no less unlawful in light of the social justifications prof-
fered by it. 39
The Court then disposed of a series of the SCTLA's arguments.
First, it held that the doctrine set out in Eastern Railroad Presi-
dents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,14 0 did not apply to
the case.'4 ' Under that doctrine certain concerted efforts genuinely
intended to influence governmental action are exempt from the an-
titrust laws. 42 The Court distinguished Noerr from the instant
case on the grounds that, in Noerr, the alleged restraint was the
intended consequence of the action whereas in this case the boy-
cott was the means by which the SCTLA sought to obtain
favorable legislation.143
The lawyers association's next argument was that if its conduct
was otherwise prohibited by the antitrust laws it was entitled to
protection by the first amendment as recognized in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co.'4 The Court was unpersuaded, noting
that the boycott involved in Claiborne Hardware was asserted by
the participants to gain no special advantage for themselves except
equal application of their constitutional rights, whereas the imme-
diate objective of the lawyers' boycott was to gain an economic ad-
vantage, however altruistic their motives.145
Finally, the Court rejected the holding of the court of appeals
that per se antitrust analysis is inapplicable to boycotts having an
137. Id. at 62,810.
138. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
139. SCTLA, 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 68,895 at 62,810.
140. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). For a discussion of the Noerr doctrine, see infra note 200 and
accompanying text.
141. SCTLA, 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,895 at 62811-12.
142. Id. at 62,812.
143. Id.
144. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). In Claiborne Hardware, the Court found that politically moti-
vated black citizens were entitled to vindicate their constitutional rights by non-violently
boycotting white merchants without fear of the antitrust laws.
145. SCTLA, 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,895, at 62,812.
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expressive component.14 The underlying premise of the holding
was flawed in that every boycott has an expressive component, and
the antitrust laws require condemnation of price fixing and boy-
cotts without proof of market power.147
Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun dissented to the
Court's holding that the per se rule was applicable to this boy-
cott.148 They noted that the success of this expressive boycott was
more likely due to political persuasion than economic coercion, es-
pecially in light of the fact that the lawyers could have been forced
to work for free as officers of the court.1 49 The dissenters believed
that the rule of reason should have been applied to the boycott
given the expressive component involved. 150
Two district court decisions rejected group boycott claims. In
Zavaletta v. American Bar Association,5" the United States Dis-
trict Court in the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary
judgment for the American Bar Association ("ABA"), rejecting the
claims of law students at CBN University Law School that the
ABA's failure to accredit their school constituted an unlawful
group boycott. The court found that the ABA's accreditation
merely constituted an expression of the ABA's educational opinion
about the quality of the school's program and such opinion placed
no restrictions on hiring, referrals or otherwise dealing with gradu-
ates of unaccredited schools.'52
In Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. American Society of Travel
Agents, Inc.,' 53 the Eastern District of Virginia orally rejected
plaintiff's contention that the exclusion of its advertisement from
the video monitors at a travel agents' association annual meeting
constituted a group boycott violating section I of the Sherman Act.
Implicit in the court's ruling was a rejection of plaintiff's inconsis-
tent allegations that the trade association was a dominant competi-
tor denying access to a unique annual event akin to an essential
facility' and at the same time, a group of independent economic
146. Id.
147. Id. at 62,813.
148. Id. at 62, 816 (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., and Blackmun, J. dissenting).
149. Id. at 62,816-18.
150. Id. at 62,816.
151. 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,671 (E.D. Va. 1989).
152. Id. at 61,538.
153. No. 89-1114-A (E.D. Va. Sept. 8, 1989).
154. "The 'essential facilities' doctrine imposes on the owner of a facility that cannot
reasonably be duplicated and which is essential to competition in a given market a duty to
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entities capable of conspiring with one another.155
F. Tying Arrangements
The difficulty of prevailing on a tying claim is emphasized by the
ease with which the federal courts dispose of them. The Fourth
Circuit affirmed the rejection of two tying claims in Stephen Jay
Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc. 56 and Zeremski v. Keystone
Title Association, Inc. . 57 In Stephen Jay Photography, the court
ruled that even assuming that yearbook photographs and school
portraits are separate products and that the official school photog-
rapher possessed market power in the tying product market by vir-
tue of its exclusive contract with the school,158 no coercion existed
to force the unlawful purchase of the tied portrait product. 15 In
Zeremski, the Fourth Circuit held that plaintiffs simply failed to
establish that the sale of one product was conditioned upon the
purchase of another, specifically, in this case, that the sale of
houses in a particular development was conditioned upon the use
of certain settlement attorneys.6 0 In similar fashion, Judge Turk
disposed of tying allegations in Tempkin v. Lewis-Gale Hospital,
Inc.,6" holding that "[p]laintiffs fail to allege a sale by defendants
to Dr. Tempkin of two different, tied products."' 2
make that facility available to its competitors on a nondiscriminatory basis." Ferguson v.
Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce Inc., 848 F.2d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 1988); see also
Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539-41 (7th Cir. 1986); Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1519-21 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds,
472 U.S. 585 (1985); MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
155. Official Airline Guides, No. 89-1114-A, slip op. at 4.
156. 903 F.2d 988.
157. No. 88-2569 (4th Cir. Aug. 30, 1989).
158. Stephen Jay Photography, 903 F.2d at 991.
159. Citing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984), and Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953), for the coercion require-
ment, the court ruled "Here, unlike the typical tying arrangement, appellees did not condi-
tion the taking of yearbook photographs on the purchase of portraits. It was abundantly
clear from the solicitation letters that the parents and students were under no obligation to
purchase portraits. Because the students had the option to purchase portraits and their
decision whether to purchase had no effect on their yearbook photographs, the relationship
here did not constitute a tying arrangement." Stephen Jay Photography, 903 F.2d at 991.
160. Zeremski, No. 88-2569, slip op. at 5.
161. 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,865 (W.D. Va. 1989).
162. Id. at 62,551-52 (citing Drs. Steuer and Latham v. Nat'l Medical Enter., Inc., 672 F.
Supp. 1489 (D. S.C. 1987), aff'd, No. 87-3753 (4th Cir. May 10, 1988) (in opposition to Dr.
Tempkin's suggestion that all hospital exclusive contracts are necessarily tying arrange-
ments). Nat'l Medical Enter., Inc. is discussed in Urbanski, supra note 44, at 475-76.
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On the other hand, in Faulkner Advertising Association, Inc. v.
Nissan Motor Corp., 6' the Fourth Circuit found allegations of a
coerced use of a Nissan advertising program tied to the sale of
Nissan automobiles sufficient to state a tying claim. Judge Hall
dissented, reasoning that only one product, automobiles, was sold.
Citing Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,6 Judge
Hall also found the new advertising program to be pro rather than
anticompetitive, thus not stating a Sherman Act claim.
G. Market Definition Issues
A significant element of proof in any Sherman Act claim is the
relevant market allegedly restrained or monopolized.6 5 Over the
past year, several such claims have been rejected by courts in the
Fourth Circuit because of plaintiffs' failure to adequately demon-
strate this element. For example, in Official Airline Guides, Inc. v.
American Society of Travel Agents, Inc.,16 6 Judge Bryan rejected
as implausible plaintiff's contention that the annual meeting of de-
fendant trade association could constitute a relevant market.16 7
Judge Bryan's analysis is consistent with the leading Fourth Cir-
cuit case on market definition, Satellite Television & Associated
Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevision of Virginia, Inc.,6 8
where the Fourth Circuit held that pay television services to apart-
ment dwellers did not constitute an appropriate product market.
The Fourth Circuit similarly rejected the furniture retailers' at-
tempt to craft a narrow market in Murrow Furniture Gallery, Inc.
v. Thomasville Furniture Industries, Inc.69 In this case, the retail-
ers argued for a product market consisting of "better branded fur-
niture" and argued that quality, price, and reputation of such fur-
niture controlled the market definition.17 0 The Fourth Circuit
163. 905 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1990).
164. 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984).
165. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); Consul, Ltd. v. Transco En-
ergy Co., 805 F.2d 490, 495 (4th Cir. 1986); Satellite Television Associated Resources v. Con-
tinental Cablevision of Virginia, 714 F.2d 351, 357 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1027 (1984).
166. No. 89-1114-A. (E.D. Va. Sept. 8, 1989).
167. Id., slip op. at 19. Plaintiffs did not assert an essential facilities argument as one
might expect, perhaps because of the reality that it could get its advertising message across
to the trade association membership in other manners. Id. at 10-11.
168. 714 F.2d 351, 355-56 (4th Cir. 1983).
169. 889 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1989).
170. Id. at 528.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
rejected this assertion, holding that these considerations are "eco-
nomically meaningless."'' The court articulated that the plaintiffs
did not meet their burden of showing that their market of "better
branded furniture" is not reasonably interchangeable with other
furniture lines.172 The court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that
standard metropolitan statistical areas used by defendant furni-
ture manufacturer for market research should be regarded as indi-
vidual geographic markets. 7 3 Instead, the court accepted defend-
ant's argument for a national market in which defendant sold less
than three percent of all wooden furniture and less than one per-
cent of all upholstered furniture.'74
In Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Adver-
tising, Inc.,'75 defendant Columbia Outdoor Advertising ("COA")
argued on appeal that the district court's jury instruction identify-
ing the outdoor advertising industry as the relevant product mar-
ket constituted an inappropriate directed verdict on that issue.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, applying the reasonable interchange-
ability and cross-elasticity of demand test set forth in United
States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.' 76 Assessing the evidence,
the Fourth Circuit found that defendant COA "offered no evidence
concerning substantiability, cross-elasticity, or other facts which
might be relevant to product market determination other than the
bald statements concerning general competition."' 77 The court re-
lied upon NCAA v. Board of Regents 78 for the Supreme Court's
analysis in determining that intercollegiate football telecasts con-
stitute a discrete product market, and upon Times-Picayune Pub-
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 528-29.
174. Id.
175. 891 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1989).
176. 353 U.S. 586 (1956). While applying the duPont test, Judge Sprouse, writing for the
panel, expressed that the result would have been the same under the "submarket concept,"
enunciated in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). Omni, 891 F.2d at 1140
n.6. Cf. Satellite Television, 714 F.2d at 355 n.5 (4th Cir. 1983). In Satellite Television, the
Fourth Circuit rejected the use of submarkets, reasoning that:
[t]he use of the term "submarket" is to be avoided; it adds only confusion to an
already imprecise and complex endeavor. For antitrust purposes a product group or
geographic area either meets the listed criteria, in which case it is a relevant market;
or it does not, in which case it is irrelevant for purposes of analysis. No fiddling with
nomenclature will change the analysis or result.
Id.
177. Omni, 891 F.2d at 1141.
178. 468 U.S. 85, 111-12 (1984).
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lishing Co. v. United States'7 9 for the Supreme Court's recognition
that newspapers, as opposed to other mass media, may constitute a
separate product market.16° The Fourth Circuit then approved the
district court's outdoor advertising product market instruction be-
cause the only evidence in the record indicated that billboards in
Columbia are not substitutable with other media and that there is
little, if any, cross-elasticity of demand between billboards and
other media.18
In United States v. Carilion Health System,182 the Fourth Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's findings of fact, reached after an
extensive trial on the merits, regarding the relevant product and
geographic markets implicated in the Antitrust Division's chal-
lenge to the proposed affiliation of two Roanoke hospitals.183 As to
the relevant product market for merger purposes, the Fourth Cir-
cuit recognized at the outset that "[t]he hospitals consist of a clus-
ter of product markets, each with a different degree of sub-
stitutability between inpatient and outpatient services.""" The
court then stated that to assess whether outpatient services should
be included in the relevant product market, an analysis of each
particular service at issue must be undertaken. "Given that the
district court was evaluating the reasonableness of the merger as a
whole, and not just for a single type of service, the court had to
determine whether the number of services subject to competition
from outpatient facilities was significant relative to the entire hos-
pital."18 5 Finding that the district court engaged in this analysis,
albeit in shorthand fashion, the court of appeals found the district
179. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
180. Id. at 611-12.
181. Omni, 891 F.2d at 1141. It is arguable that the Fourth Circuit's product market de-
termination in Omni is inconsistent with its earlier opinion in Satellite Television in that
while Satellite Television appropriately places the burden of proving a product market on
the antitrust plaintiff, Omni calls for rebuttal market evidence from the antitrust defendant.
The cases may be rationalized procedurally, however, because Satellite Television was a
summary judgment case and Omni was an appeal of the grant of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
182. 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,859 (4th Cir. 1989).
183. Rejecting the relevant markets advocated by the Antitrust Division, the district
court found that the relevant product market included both inpatient and certain outpa-
tient hospital services and that the relevant geographic market was not limited to the Roa-
noke Valley but encompassed a wide expanse of southwestern Virginia from which one of
the affiliating hospitals drew at least 100 patients per year. Id.; see Urbanski, supra note 44,
at 468-69 (1989).
184. Carilion, 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,859 at 62,515.
185. Id.
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court's factual determination as to the product market not clearly
erroneous.18
6
As to the relevant geographic market, the court noted that the
"geographic market should include all locations to which a cus-
tomer would travel to obtain the product if the seller were to raise
the price."' 8 7 The government objected to the district court's geo-
graphic market because it argued that patients from outlying areas
would not switch from the Roanoke Valley hospitals to those closer
to home because of patients' perceptions that the Roanoke hospi-
tals are higher quality facilities.188 The Fourth Circuit demurred,
ruling that "[w]hile the government's argument has some force, the
record does contain evidence that the hospitals compete within the
area defined by the district court, and we cannot say this finding is
clearly erroneous. '' 589
H. Antitrust Immunity Issues
The United States Supreme Court issued one opinion this past
year related to the antitrust immunity field. In W.S. Kirkpatrick &
Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. International,8 " the Court
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 62,516. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Rockford Memo-
rial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990), upheld a much narrower product and geographic
market. The court in Rockford excluded services rendered by non-hospital providers, rea-
soning that the existence of substitutes for certain services places no check on the prices of
services for which the acute care hospital has no competitors. As regards the geographic
market, the court focused exclusively on where Rockford residents turn for hospital services,
considering such services local.
People want to be hospitalized near their families and homes, in hospitals in which
their own-local-doctors have hospital privileges. There are good hospitals in Rock-
ford, and they succeed in attracting most of the hospital patients not only from Rock-
ford itself but from the surrounding area delineated by the district judge.
Rockford, 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990). The Seventh Circuit rejected the geographic
market advanced by the hospitals consisting of the service area from which the hospitals
draw patients, considering it "ridiculous. . . that Rockford residents, or third-party payors,
will be searching out small, obscure hospitals in remote rural areas if the prices charged by
the hospitals in Rockford are above competitive levels." Id. While not on all fours with the
Rockford district court's geographic market analysis, the Seventh Circuit accepted it under
the deferential clearly erroneous standard. While the circuit court opinions in the Roanoke
and Rockford affiliations appear at odds, one must consider the deferential nature of each
appellate court's review of the findings of facts facing it and the evidence tendered at the
trial of each case. See Poff, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A Study of the Roanoke and
Rockford Decisions, 6(9) Hosp. L. Newsl. 1 (1989).
190. 110 S. Ct. 701 (1990).
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ruled that the act of state doctrine is not applicable where the
cause of action merely requires imputing foreign officials an unlaw-
ful motivation in performance of an official sovereign act. The doc-
trine is only applicable where the cause of action questions the va-
lidity of such an act. 91 The case arose because Kirkpatrick
obtained a contract from the Republic of Nigeria by bribing cer-
tain Nigerian public officials. 192 Environmental Tectonics, an un-
successful bidder, learned of the bribes and brought this action
under, inter alia, the Robinson-Patman Act.'93 Kirkpatrick moved
to dismiss on the grounds that the action was barred by the act of
state doctrine.9 4
Affirming the Third Circuit, the Court found the factual predi-
cate for application of the doctrine non-existent.'95 In all previous
cases applying the doctrine, "the relief sought or the defense inter-
posed would have required a [U.S.] court . . . to declare invalid
the official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own ter-
ritory."9 6 The Court concluded that "[t]he act of state doctrine
does not establish an exception for cases . . . that may embarrass
foreign governments, but merely requires that, in the process of
deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within' their own ju-
risdictions shall be deemed valid.' 9 7 Since bribery of public offi-
cials is illegal in Nigeria, the validity of no foreign act was at issue
in this case, so the doctrine was therefore held inapplicable.
Continuing a recurring theme of Fourth Circuit antitrust juris-
prudence, Virginia state and federal courts addressed antitrust im-
munity issues under the state action doctrine, 9 8 the Local Govern-
191. Id. at 707.
192. Id. at 703.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 706.
196. Id. at 704.
197. Id. at 707.
198. The doctrine of state action immunity was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943), where the Court held that the Sherman Act was
not intended to prohibit states from imposing restraints on competition. "Although Parker
involved an action against a state official, the Court's reasoning extends to suits against
private parties." Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S.
48, 56 (1985). The circumstances under which the state action doctrine immunizes private
conduct were refined in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
445 U.S. 97 (1980). The Court's opinion in Midcal establishes a two-pronged test for deter-
mining whether state regulation of private parties invokes state action immunity. "First, the
challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state
policy;' second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the state itself." Id. at 105 (citing
1990]
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ment Antitrust Act 9 ' and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. °0
After reciting that "[t]o avail itself of the Parker exemption
then, a municipality must show only that it is adhering to a state
City of Lafayettte v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)). See also
Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Clair, 471 U.S.
34 (1985). The Court in Southern Motor Carriers took the Midcal analysis one step further
and addressed whether state compulsion is required to immunize the actions of private par-
ties. Discounting reliance on Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), for the
establishment of a compulsion requirement, the Court held that state compulsion is not a
prerequisite to a finding of state action immunity:
A private party acting pursuant to an anti-competitive regulatory program need not
"point to a specific, detailed legislative authorization" for its challenged conduct. As
long as the State as sovereign clearly intends to displace competition in a particular
field with a regulatory structure, the first prong of the Midcal test is satisfied.
Southern Motor Carriers, 471 U.S. at 64 (citation omitted).
The Hallie Court applied the "clearly articulated state policy" test to municipalities but
held that active state supervision is not required to immunize their conduct from the anti-
trust laws. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 47.
199. The Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 ("LGAA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp.
1984), was enacted to clarify antitrust immunity of local governments. The legislative his-
tory of the LGAA noted concern over an "increasing number of antitrust suits, and
threatened suits, that could undermine a local government's ability to govern in the public
interest." H.R. Rep. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 4602, 4603. 15 U.S.C. § 35(a) provides that "[n]o damages, interest on
damages, cost or attorney's fees may be recovered under Section 4, 4A of FCV of the Clay-
ton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a or 15c) from any local government, or official or employee
thereof acting in an official capacity." This statute was apparently a reaction to the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40
(1982).
In Boulder, the Court refused to exempt a Colorado city's actions regarding its regulation
of cable television. The Court was unpersuaded by the city's argument that the Colorado
Constitution delegated regulation of cable television to municipalities by means of its "home
rule" amendment reasoning:
The Parker state-action exemption reflects Congress' intention to embody in the
Sherman Act the federalism principle that the State possesses a significant measure
of sovereignty under our Constitution. But this principle contains its own limitation:
Ours is a dual system of government, Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added),
which has no place for sovereign cities.
Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53..
Because Colorado had taken no position on the regulation of cable television, the Court
held that the city's conduct did not meet the Parker "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed as state policy" test as refined by Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105.
200. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine exempts efforts to petition the government from an-
titrust liability. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). Under this doctrine,
joint lobbying and other efforts to "influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws
even though intended 'to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing
alone or as part of a broader scheme itself violative of the Sherman Act." Pennington, 381
U.S. at 670. Noerr/Pennington immunity has been expanded beyond efforts to influence
legislation to include activity directed at courts and administrative agencies.
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policy to replace competition with regulation,"' 0' 1 the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Ad-
vertising, Inc.20 2 determined that the South Carolina legislature
envisioned the local regulation of billboards under general zoning
statutes,203 and noting its prior "lenient" treatment of the question
of legislative contemplation of an anticompetitive effort," 4 held
that the authority to regulate billboards makes an anticompetitive
effort of regulation substantially foreseeable.0 The court never-
theless refused to apply state action immunity, holding that the
jury verdict against the city compels the application of the
conspiracy exception to Parker v. Brown.0 6 Citing Westborough
Mall, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau207 and Whitworth v. Per-
kins, °5 the Fourth Circuit held that Parker immunity was not
available in cases where the conduct "relates not to the purpose of
attaining governmental action but solely to forcing competitors
from a particular market. '20 9 As the jury returned a verdict against
the city, the appellate court assumed economic improprieties.210
201. Omni, 891 F.2d at 1131.
202. 891 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1989).
203. Id. at 1132. Cf. Pendleton Constr. Corp. v. Rockbridge County, 652 F. Supp. 312
(W.D. Va. 1987), aff'd on its reasoning, 837 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1988); Racetrac Petroleum,
Inc. v. Prince George's County, 601 F. Supp. 892, 906-10 (D. Md. 1985), afl'd, 786 F.2d 202,
318 (4th Cir. 1986).
204. Omni, 891 F.2d at 1132 (citing Coastal Neuro-Psychiatric Ass'n v. Onslow Memorial
Hosp., 795 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1986)). In dicta, the Fourth Circuit in Omni opined that local
restrictions on hospital staff privileges pursuant to state statute satisfy the Midcal "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy" test. Id.
205. Id. at 1132. The Omni court applied Hallie to its facts in a two-step manner, first
requiring the existence of a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy" to
displace competition with regulation and the second that said policy "clearly contemplates"
that the municipality may effect anticompetitive conduct. Id. As the Fourth Circuit noted in
Coastal, 795 F.2d at 342, "Town of Hallie requires that local anticompetitive conduct be 'a
foreseeable result' of the state enactment for antitrust exemption to apply."
206. In Parker, the Court held that "[w]e have no questions [in this case] of the state or
its municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination by others for
restraint of trade." 317 U.S. at 351-52.
207. 693 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
208. 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 992, aff'd on rehearing, 576 F.2d 697
(1978).
209. Omni, 891 F.2d at 1134.
210. The Fourth Circuit explained:
In view of the overriding economic thrust of Sherman Act concerns, it is tempting to
consider all political activity as beyond the Act's purpose or reach. Certainly, Con-
gress did not contemplate imposing economic oversight of political abuses per se. Yet
the language of the Sherman Act is broad enough to include the proscription of ac-
tions where politicians or political entities are involved as conspirators. Moreover, we
are constrained by established interpretation from excluding from Sherman Act con-
sideration all conspiracies which have some political coloration. If it were otherwise,
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Judge Wilkins dissented, stating that the district court's conspir-
acy instruction was too general, leaving the jury to conclude that
lobbying alone was a sufficient basis upon which to find a conspir-
acy.211 Judge Wilkins also disagreed with the majority's rejection of
Parker immunity based upon principles of federalism and a con-
cern over a potential chilling effect on public service.212
In summary fashion, the Fourth Circuit also addressed Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire21 3 municipality immunity in Pinehurst
Enterprises, Inc. v. Town of Southern Pines.1 4 In Pinehurst, the
North Carolina district court held that Hallie immunized a munic-
ipality's use of its statutorily prescribed zoning authority to regu-
late sewage services.21 5 There public utility companies sought the
right to service a golf club development located within the defend-
ant municipality.216 The court held that Hallie immunized the mu-
nicipality's action in excluding the public utilities from rendering
their competitive services. 217 In its opinion, the district court rec-
the Supreme Court in post-Parker decisions would have given municipalities the
same blanket protection it had awarded states in Parker. Even so, we must be very
careful in these cases to assure that any political abuse has so completely metamor-
phosed into an economic abuse that it properly can be regulated by application of
Sherman Act legal-economic procedures. In view of the jury verdict, we think that is
what is involved here.
Id.
211. Judge Wilkins also deemed a remand inappropriate, finding that even if a more defi-
nite charge had been given, the record evidence was insufficient to support a conspiracy
verdict against the city.
At no time did COA employees threaten anyone or use otherwise coercive tactics. No
one engaged in deception or misrepresentation to secure passage of the billboard ordi-
nances. There was no evidence of any illegal conduct such as bribery, coercion, vio-
lence, kickbacks, or the like. Neither the Mayor nor the City Council members stood
to gain any personal financial advantage by passing the billboard ordinances nor was
there any evidence of any other selfish or otherwise corrupt motive. Without some
evidence of activity such as this, I would affirm the district court and hold that anti-
trust immunity attached.
Id. at 1146 (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
212. Judge Wilkins cautioned:
I fear that the holding of the majority may invite heretofore unauthorized federal
antitrust lawsuits against municipalities. Losers in political battles will be able to
achieve all or some of their objectives by threatening antitrust litigation and, in the
process, discourage public officials from performing their public duties while they
contend with antitrust allegations.
Id. at 1150.
213. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
214. 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,784 (4th Cir. 1989), af'g 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1
68,206 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
215. 1988-2 Trade Cas. at (CCH) 59,355.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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ognized that the Fourth Circuit has applied state action immunity
broadly to exercise of zoning power by local governments.2 18
In similar fashion, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia, in Airport Properties Ltd. Partnership v.
Capital Region Airport Commission,1 9 in which the plaintiffs
claimed a wrongful denial of an easement to allow easier access to
the Richmond airport, granted defendant airport commission's mo-
tion for summary judgement on state action grounds, reasoning
that the state legislation met Hallie's clear articulation test. The
court also dismissed claims brought under the Virginia Antitrust
Act 220 based on state action, citing Reasor v. City of Norfolk,22,
and the statutory immunity contained in the Act.222
The Fourth Circuit in Omni also invoked the "sham exception"
to deny Noerr-Pennington immunity to the city.223 Citing Hospital
218. Id. (citing Pendleton Constr. Corp. v. Rockbridge County, 837 F.2d 178 (4th cir.
1988), aff'g per curiam 652 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Va. 1987)).
219. No. 89-00393-R (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 1989).
220. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.18 (Rep. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1990).
221. 606 F. Supp. 788, 796 (E.D. Va. 1984) (Parker immunity foreclosed liability under
the state act).
222. The Virginia Antitrust Act by its terms immunizes certain anticompetitive conduct:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall make unlawful conduct that is authorized,
regulated, or approved (1) by a statute of this Commonwealth or (2) by an adminis-
trative or constitutionally established agency of this Commonwealth or of the United
States having jurisdiction of the subject matter and having authority to consider the
anticompetitive effect, if any, of such conduct.
VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.4(b) (Repl. Vol. 1987).
223. Omni, 891 F.2d at 1138-39. In Noerr, the Court noted that "[t]here may be situa-
tions in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental
action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere
directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman
Act would be justified." Noerr, 365 U.S. 127, at 144.
In California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1971), the Court
noted:
There are many other forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which may corrupt
the administrative or judicial processes and which may result in antitrust violations.
Misrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used in
the adjudicatory process. Opponents before agencies or courts often think poorly of
the other's tactics, motions, or defenses and may readily call them baseless. One
claim, which a court or agency may think baseless, may go unnoticed; but a pattern of
baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the fact-finder to conclude that
the administrative and judicial processes have been abused. That may be a difficult
line to discern and draw. But, once it is drawn, the case is established that abuse of
those processes produced an illegal result, viz., effectively barring respondents from
access to the agencies and courts. Insofar as the administrative or judicial processes
are involved, actions of that kind cannot acquire immunity by seeking refuge under
the umbrella of "political expression."
404 U.S. at 513.
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Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital 24 for the proposition
that "[a]ctions taken to discourage and actually prevent competi-
tors from meaningful access to the processes of administrative
agencies fall within the sham exception, 225 the Fourth Circuit
found that the record supported the jury's conclusion that COA's
interaction with city officials constitute nothing more than "an at-
tempt to 'harass and deter Omni.' ",22' Again, Judge Wilkins dis-
sented, reasoning that Rex II is distinguishable from the facts in
Omni because it involved "baseless appeals of the administrative
process 'with the intent to delay.., entrance into the... mar-
ket.' ",227 Instead, Judge Wilkins suggested that the sham exception
test was appropriately set forth in Rex II1228 and required that the
efforts to influence the government, rather than the governmental
decision itself, inflict the antitrust injury and that the petitioner
has no reasonable expectation of obtaining a favorable decision.229
Judge Wilkins concluded that:
The lobbying efforts of COA do not meet the definition of a sham as
explained in HBC III [Rex III]. COA genuinely lobbied for ordi-
nances which, if passed, would substantially foreclose Omni from
the Columbia market. Not only did COA expect favorable results
from its lobbying efforts, it was in fact successful in obtaining the
billboard ordinances it sought. Nor was the injury to Omni inflicted
directly by the COA lobbying efforts. Rather, any injury inflicted
was by governmental action-the enactment of the billboard
ordinances. 30
224. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., (Rex I), 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1982).
225. Id. at 687; see also Pendleton Constr. Corp. v. Rockbridge County. 652 F. Supp. 312,
319 (W.D. VA 1987), aff'd, 837 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1988).
226. Omni, 891 F.2d at 1139.
227. Id. at 1147 (quoting Rex II 691 F.2d at 687) (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
228. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., (Rex III) 791 F.2d 288 (4th Cir. 1986).
229. In Rex III, the court held:
[T]he basic concept [of the same exception], as employed by the Supreme Court, is
that the defendant's activity was intended to injure the plaintiff directly rather than
through a governmental decision. When the antitrust defendant had not truly sought
to influence a governmental decision, his invocation of governmental machinery is a
sham. To be sure, he would always be pleased to obtain a governmental decision
against his rival. But where he had no reasonable expectation of obtaining the
favorable ruling, his effort to do so was a sham.
Id. at 292 (quoting P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW § 203.1A (Supp. 1982) (emphasis added)).
Judge Wilkins also suggested that Rex 11 was not inconsistent when its facts are considered
in context. Omni, 891 F.2d at 1148.
230. Omni, 891 F.2d at 1148.
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While not addressed by the majority, Judge Wilkins also re-
jected the co-conspirator exception to Noerr-Pennington immu-
nity,231 expressing concern that this exception may emasculate the
immunity doctrine. 32 Finding no evidence of illegal conduct or
corrupt motive on behalf of the city officials, Judge Wilkins found
the exception inapplicable.
In General Medical Corp. v. Wyngarden,233 the Circuit Court for
the City of Richmond rejected a crossbill that alleged that the fil-
ing of the motion for judgment was within the sham exception to
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
In Zavaletta v. American Bar Association,3 4 the district court
commented briefly on the ABA's right to communicate its opinion
to governmental bodies. 3 5
I. Antitrust Injury
Private antitrust plaintiffs must meet the threshold requirement
of showing antitrust injury, derived from section 4 of the Clayton
Act,23e which provides treble damages to "[a]ny person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbid-
den in the antitrust laws. '237 In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-
0-Mat,238 the court pronounced, "[P]laintiffs must prove antitrust
injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were
designed to prevent and that flows from that which makes defend-
ants' acts unlawful."2 9
The concept of antitrust injury formed the basis for the indirect
purchaser rule announced over a decade ago in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois. 240 The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
231. See Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1282 (3d Cir. 1975) (where the conduct
surpasses the realm of 'official persuasion' encompassing a scheme to restrain trade).
232. Omni, 891 F.2d at 1148.
233. No. HA-98-3 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. Apr. 20, 1990).
234. 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 68,671 (E.D. Va. 1989).
235. Id. at 61,538.
236. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
237. Id.
238. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
239. Id. at 489 (emphasis in original).
240. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). The indirect purchaser rule bars indirect purchasers from suing
an overcharging supplier. The rule derives from the Court's holding in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), which rejected the pass on defense. In that
case, an overcharging supplier attempted to avoid liability by alleging that its purchaser
suffered no injury because it passed on the overcharges to its customers. The Court reasoned
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that rule in the context of regulated public utilities. In Kansas and
Missouri v. Utilicorp. United, Inc.,4 1 the Court held that the cus-
tomers of a public utility to which its supplier's natural gas
overcharges were passed on did not suffer antitrust injury for pur-
poses of section 4 of the Clayton Act. Only the public utility, the
direct purchaser, could assert a section 4 claim against the natural
gas supplier who overcharged it in violation of the antitrust laws.242
The Court refused to carve out an exception to the indirect pur-
chaser rule where regulated public utilities are involved because it
found the difficulties of apportioning the overcharges 243 to be as
great with regulated industries as with unregulated ones. In fact,
the Court suggested that the justifications for an exception to the
indirect purchaser rule were less compelling in the regulated con-
text because state regulators often require compensated utilities to
pass on to their customers at least some of their recovery obtained
in section 4 suits.244 In defending its decision, the Court observed
that application of the indirect purchaser rule to regulated indus-
tries would not adversely affect private enforcement because utili-
ties do not lack incentives to sue overcharging suppliers.245
Furthermore, while affirming its observations in Illinois Brick
that an exception to the rule may be justified when cost-plus con-
tracts are involved, the Court rejected the argument that regula-
tions and tariffs requiring the utility to pass on its costs to con-
sumers placed this case in the cost-plus contract exception.246 The
Court also dismissed petitioners argument that under section 4(c)
of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,
they as state attorneys general could bring a parens patriae action
on behalf of the utility customers notwithstanding the customers'
that establishing the amount of the overcharge shifted to indirect purchasers "would nor-
mally prove insurmountable,"Id. at 493, and the pass on defense would reduce the effective-
ness of section 4 actions by reducing the recovery available to any potential plaintiff. Id. at
494. The Court's decision that overcharging suppliers could not use the pass on defense
against direct purchasers was followed by its adoption of the indirect purchaser rule in Illi-
nois Brick. The indirect purchaser rule was a logical corollary to the rejection of the pass-on
defense, since overcharging suppliers may risk multiple liability if suits by indirect purchas-
ers were allowed. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 730-31.
241. 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990)
242. Id. at 2812.
243. Id. at 2814.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 2814-15.
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status as indirect purchasers.247 This provision could not support a
parens patriae action because the utility customers simply had not
suffered antitrust injury, the Court reasoned.24
In a decision which may mark a shift in the Court's thinking as
to the application of the per se rule to vertical, maximum price
fixing schemes, the Supreme Court held in Atlantic Richfield Co.
v. USA Petroleum Co. 249 that a firm which loses sales to a competi-
tor charging nonpredatory prices pursuant to such a scheme does
not suffer "antitrust injury" as required by section 4 of the Clayton
Act. USA, an independent discount retail marketer of gasoline, al-
leged that Atlantic Richfield Company ("ARCO") had engaged in a
vertical, maximum price fixing scheme with its dealers in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.28 0 ARCO, to compete more effec-
tively with independent discounters such as USA, had imple-
mented a new marketing strategy to encourage its dealers to match
retail gasoline prices of independents.2 51 It made short-term dis-
counts available to its dealers and it reduced its dealers' costs by,
for instance, eliminating credit card sales. 52
The district court granted summary judgment holding that even
if USA could establish that ARCO had engaged in a vertical resale
price maintenance conspiracy with its dealers to maintain low
prices, it could not satisfy the "antitrust injury" requirement of
section 4 without showing such prices to be predatory.2 3 Such a
showing was impossible because ARCO did not possess market
power.25 14
A divided Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that USA's claimed
injuries were a direct result of a disruption in the market caused
by a per se antitrust violation.25 Accordingly, USA had suffered
antitrust injury.256
Reversing the Ninth Circuit, Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, began his analysis by noting that in Albrecht v. Her-
247. Id. at 2815.
248. Id.
249. 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990).
250. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1887.
251. Id. at 1888.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1889.
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ald,257 where the court had declared vertical, maximum price fixing
arrangements per se unlawful, the concern was with the potential
effect on dealers and consumers, not on competitors.25 8 In the in-
stant case, USA was a competitor who was more likely benefitted
than harmed by ARCO's pricing policies.2 59 Thus, the Court held
that USA had not suffered "antitrust injury" because its losses did
not result from the anticompetitive effects of vertical, maximum
price fixing which render it illegal.26 °
The Court further held that USA could not claim as antitrust
injury losses resulting from the low prices produced by the pricing
scheme when the prices were nonpredatory.26'1 "Low prices benefit
consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as
they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition.
Hence, they cannot give rise to antitrust injury. '262
The Court rejected the notion that antitrust injury need not be
shown where a per se violation is involved. It held these rules are
distinct and must be shown independently:2 63
The antitrust injury requirement ensures that a plaintiff can recover
only if the loss stems from a competition-reducing aspect or effect of
the defendant's behavior. The need for this showing is at least as
great under the per se rule as under the rule of reason. Indeed, inso-
far as the per se rule permits the prohibition of efficient practices in
the name of simplicity, the need for the antitrust injury requirement
is underscored.2 4
The Court concluded that it was unnecessary to relax the antitrust
injury requirement in cases such as this since a competitor would
257. 390 U.S. 145 (1968). In Albrecht, the Court found a vertical, maximum price fixing
arrangement unlawful per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The case involved a news-
paper publisher which disciplined a distributor for selling newspapers at a price higher than
the suggested retail price. The Court reasoned that such an arrangement threatened to in-
hibit vigorous competition among dealers bound by it and would tend to become a mini-
mum price fixing scheme.
258. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1889.
259. Id. USA would be benefitted if ARCO's pricing policies resulted in fewer, larger
ARCO distributors or prevented ARCO's dealers from engaging in non-price competition
such as offering services desired by consumers such as credit card sales. Id.
260. Id. at 1892.
261. Id. at 1890.
262. Id. at 1892.
263. Id. at 1894 (quoting P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, Antitrust Law 334.2c (Supp.
1989)).
264. ARCO, 110 S. Ct. at 1894. (emphasis in original).
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"be injured and hence motivated to sue only when a vertical, maxi-
mum price fixing arrangement has a procompetitive impact on the
market." 26 5
Dissenting Justices Stevens and White decried the majority's
opinion, asserting that it "undermines the enforceability of a sub-
stantive price-fixing violation with a flawed construction of section
4, erroneously assuming that the level of a price fixed by a section
1 conspiracy is relevant to legality and that all vertical arrange-
ments conform to a single model. 266
The Fourth Circuit found antitrust injury present in Omni Out-
door Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc.,26, 7
holding that Omni's evidence indicated that the city's final ordi-
nance prohibited any future billboard construction, thus foreclos-
ing any competition to Columbia Outdoor Advertising, not just
from Omni but any other potential competitors.26 s In Tempkin v.
Lewis-Gale Hospital, Inc.,269 Judge Turk dismissed plaintiffs' alle-
gations of loss of personal employment as insufficient to constitute
antitrust injury.170 He similarly dismissed Sherman Act claims in
Spire Corp. v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.,7 1 in
part for failure to allege antitrust injury. 7 2
J. Procedure, Evidence and Remedies
1. Procedure
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia certified an antitrust class action alleging price-fixing against
soft drink bottlers in Richmond and Norfolk, 273 distinguishing its
prior opinions denying class certification, which arose out of the
same alleged conspiracy.27 4 In Meredith v. Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola
265. Id. at 1895 (emphasis in original).
266. Id. at 1895-96 (White, J. and Stevens, J. dissenting).
267. 891 F.2d 1127, 1143 (4th Cir. 1989).
268. Id. (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 489 n.14 (1977);
Ratino v. Medical Serv., 718 F.2d 1260, 1272 (4th Cir. 1983)).
269. 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,683 (W.D. Va. 1989).
270. Id. at 62,551.
271. No. 88-0271-R (W.D. Va. Oct. 3 1989) (mem. op).
272. Id. at 4.
273. Meredith v. Mid-Atlantic Coca Cola Bottling Co., 129 F.R.D. 130, 134 (E.D. Va.
1989).
274. Butt v. Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 116 F.R.D. (E.D. Va. 1987); Mom's, Inc. v.
Allegheny Pepsi*Cola Bottling Co., No. 87-219-N (E.D. Va. 1987).
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Bottling Co., 275 two operators of small food markets sought class
certification of their price-fixing claims. Defendant bottlers op-
posed certification, grounding their argument on Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 Defendants argued that plain-
tiffs "are not typical of the class, that they will not adequately re-
present the class, that issues of fact or law common to the class do
not predominate, and that class certification is an inferior method
of adjudicating the class' claims. 277 Judge Merhige had little diffi-
culty finding that the plaintiffs had met the numerosity and com-
monality requirements of Rule 23(a)27  and found typicality even
though some variations existed as to the size of the class members'
operations and the prices they paid. Citing Surowitz v. Hilton
275. 129 F.R.D. 130 (E.D. Va. 1989).
276. Rule 23 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common
to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims of defenses of the class, and the (4) representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their in-
terests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corre-
sponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest
of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of sepa-
rate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or unde-
sirability of concentrating on the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D)
the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
277. Meredith, 129 F.R.D. at 132.
278. Id. at 132-133.
279. Id. at 133. Judge Merhige ruled that plaintiffs need not be identical and reasoned
that "[t]ypicality exists so long as the claims are based on the same legal or remedial theory
and no conflict of interest exists between the named plaintiff and the class members." Id.
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Hotels Corp.,280 for the proposition that insufficient knowledge of
the claim on behalf of the named plaintiff is not an appropriate
basis for denying class certification, Judge Merhige discounted
plaintiffs' misunderstanding of the nature of the suit and deter-
mined them to be adequate representatives. 28 ' As to the require-
ment of Rule 23(b), Judge Merhige found that while each class
member may have a different amount of damages, common ques-
tions of law and fact as to the existence of the conspiracy, the ef-
fect and extent of the conspiracy, and a class-wide measure of
damages existed. 82 Finally, finding no conflict between class mem-
bers, Judge Merhige found the class action to be superior to other
forms of adjudication.28
In certifying the class, Judge Merhige distinguished the 1987
Norfolk division opinions in Butt v. Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co.284 and Mom's, Inc. v. Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.,2 85
where Judge MacKenzie denied class certification. Judge MacKen-
zie ruled that (1) the injury to each class member varied by cus-
tomer, transaction and products purchased,288 (2) plaintiff would
be "unable to establish damages by common proof on a class-wide
basis, '287 (3) because the putative class included a number of high
volume customers having sufficient economic interests to pursue
their own suits, the class action was not a superior legal procedure,
and finally, (5) that pursuant to Windham v. American Brands,
Inc.,2 88 the class was unmanageable. 2 9 Regardless of Judge Mer-
hige's distinction of Butt, his opinion did not address the concerns
raised by Judge MacKenzie as to the injury sustained by customers
280. 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
281. Meredith, 129 F.R.D. at 133.
282. Id. at 134.
283. Id.
284. 116 F.R.D. 486 (E.D. Va. 1987).
285. No. 87-219-N (E.D. Va. 1987).
286. Butt v. Alleghany Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 116 F.R.D. at 491. In Butt, the court
noted that the primary evidence of pricing fixing presented at the criminal trial, United
States v. Gravely, Crim. No. 86-102-N (E.D. Va. 1987), involved promotional letter pricing.
Judge MacKenzie was unconvinced that a price-fixing conspiracy regarding promotional let-
ter pricing affected other purchases and concluded, therefore, that proof of injury must in-
volve a customer-by-customer inquiry as to promotional letter purchases. Judge MacKenzie
also noted that the possibility that the alleged conspirators cheated on the agreement "in-
troduced enormous additional complications to determining whether individual members of
the proposed class were in fact injured." Butt, 116 F.R.D. at 491.
287. Butt, 116 F.R.D. at 492.
288. 68 F.R.D. 641, 658 (D. S.C. 1975), rev'd, 539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd en banc,
565 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).
289. Butt, 116 F.R.D. at 493.
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receiving promotional letter pricing and those that did not.29 0 Also,
Judge Merhige accepted, where Judge MacKenzie did not, the con-
clusion that all soft drink prices were affected by the alleged con-
spiracy, thus allowing a simplified percentage increase in average
price to constitute a class-wide measure of damages. Moreover, as
the two cases each concerned Norfolk and Richmond soft drink
sales, Judge Merhige's disregard for Judge MacKenzie's finding
that a test case brought by large volume purchasers would be a
superior legal vehicle to a class action is mystifying.
In Vincent v. Reynolds Memorial Hospital, Inc.,29 1 a plaintiff
physician, who alleged an antitrust conspiracy in the hospital staff
privileges context, appealed from the district court's decision to
dismiss his Sherman Act claims on the basis of the statute of limi-
tations and the res judicata effect of prior state court litigation.
The Fourth Circuit held that while Vincent alleged that the con-
spiracy commenced in 1969, the four-year statute of limitations 29 2
only barred acts occurring before 1977, four years before suit was
filed. As to res judicata, the court held that as "each act of a de-
fendant which injures a plaintiff during the course of a conspiracy
to violate the antitrust laws constitutes a separate cause of action
for which the plaintiff may recover damages,"'2 3 the federal allega-
tions Vincent did not raise in the prior state proceeding were not
barred by res judicata.294
2. Evidence
In reversing the Robinson-Patman Act judgment against Loril-
lard in Thomas J. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc.,295 the Fourth Cir-
cuit determined that the district court committed error in admit-
ting the testimony of plaintiff's sole expert witness on the issue of
whether Lorillard's shift in credit practice was unjustified credit
discrimination.26 Assessing the plaintiff's expert under Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 97 the court noted that the putative
290. See Mom's Inc., No. 87-219-N.
291. 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,681 (4th Cir. 1989).
292. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1988).
293. Vincent, 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,681 at 61,595.
294. Id.
295. 878 F.2d 791, 800 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1120 (1990).
296. Id. at 799.
297. FED. R. EVID. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of the fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
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expert witness, while she had attained an M.B.A., was not an econ-
omist."9 8 Moreover, she had published only one article, which was
unrelated to credit or antitrust, had no personal experience in
making credit decisions, and worked for an employer primarily en-
gaged in the business of providing expert testimony in litigation. 99
The court held:
Certainly no single one of these facts disqualifies [the expert] from
giving opinions about the legitimacy of the justifications for Loril-
lard's credit decisions. In combination, however, they lead us to the
conclusion that this witness cannot satisfy even the minimal re-
quirements of Fed. R. Evid. 702. There was no indication, for exam-
ple, that [the expert's] general business education included any
training in the area of antitrust or credit. Similarly, [the expert] ad-
mitted that she lacked any other experience in such matters. Al-
though it would be incorrect to conclude that [the expert's] occupa-
tion as a professional expert alone requires exclusion of her
testimony, it would be absurd to conclude the one can become an
expert simply by accumulating experience in testifying."'
Plaintiff's expert admitted that she had no experience in making
credit decisions, and her testimony confirms that she totally lacked
the "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" that Rule
702 requires of an expert witness.301
3. Remedies
The United States Supreme Court, resolving a conflict among
the circuits, has decided that in merger cases divestiture is a rem-
edy available to private plaintiffs under section 16 of the Clayton
Act. In California v. American Stores Co.,302 California sued after
two of its largest retail grocery chains merged, claiming violations
of federal and state antitrust laws. The state obtained a prelimi-
nary injunction from the district court preventing further integra-
tion of the operations of the two companies.3 0 3 The Ninth Circuit,
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
298. Lorillard, 878 F.2d at 799.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 800.
302. 1990-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 5 69,003 (U.S. April 30, 1990)
303. Id. at 63,487.
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reversed, holding that "injunctive relief," as contemplated by sec-
tion 16, did not encompass divestiture and that therefore the dis-
trict court did not have the authority to order the "indirect
divestiture."" 4
The Supreme Court, unpersuaded by American's textual and
legislative history arguments, disagreed with the Ninth Circuit and
found that the plain text of section 16 authorizes private enforce-
ment actions for divestiture to remedy section 7 violations. 0 5
While the Government enjoys the right to obtain divestiture under
section 15, the Court noted that private plaintiffs must demon-
strate standing to obtain such equitable relief.306 It was also quick
to point out that, while not at issue in this case, equitable defenses
such as laches and unclean hands "may protect consummated
transactions from belated attacks by private parties when it would
not be too late for the Government to vindicate the public
interest. 307
In two antitrust opinions, Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v.
308 WelThomasville Furniture Industries, Inc., and Wells American
Corp. v. Ziff-Davis Publ. Co.,30e the Fourth Circuit affirmed the de-
nial of preliminary injunctions, simply ruling in each case that
plaintiff failed the Blackwelder3 10 test.31'
In Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Adver-
tising, Inc.,s32 the Fourth Circuit applied a lenient standard of
proof for antitrust damages313 and held that once this relaxed evi-
dentiary burden had been met, the burden shifted to the defend-
ant to produce evidence "which was primarily in its possession" 14
that plaintiff's losses were caused by reasons other than defend-
304. Id.
305. Id. at 63,494.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. 889 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1989).
309. 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,960 (4th Cir. 1990).
310. Blackwelder Furn. Co. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977).
311. Murrow, 889 F.2d at 526-29; Wells American, 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 68,960 at
63,512.
312. 891 F.2d 1127 (4th Cir. 1989).
313. Id. at 1143-44 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S. 100, 123-25
(1969); Metrix Warehouse v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft,-, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); Barber & Ross Co. v. Lifetime Doors, 810 F.2d
1276, 1281 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 823 (1987)).
314. Omni, 891 F.2d at 1144.
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ant's anticompetitive activities. 15 The Fourth Circuit also rejected
arguments that insufficient evidence existed to support the damage
award and that awards on both sections 1 and 2 counts were incon-
sistent and duplicative."
The Supreme Court, in the context of a multimillion dollar
treble antitrust judgment, clarified application of 28 U.S.C. § 1961
which governs the award of postjudgment interest. In Kaiser Alu-
minum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno,17 the Court noted that, al-
though there was a conflict among the circuits, 28 U.S.C. § 1961's
language is clear that postjudgment interest runs.from the date the
court enters judgment, not from the typically earlier time when the
jury renders the verdict.3 18 Furthermore, the Court held that inter-
est should be calculated from the date damages are "ascer-
tained. '319 Thus, the Court rejected the argument that interest
should run from a much earlier date on which judgment was en-
tered on liability but found legally insufficient as to damages. 20
The correct date governing accumulation of interest was the date
of judgment governing damages.2
Finally, the Supreme Court had occasion in an antitrust context
to clarify the application of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp..22 In Cooter, the
Court ruled that a party which files court papers with no basis in
fact may not avoid Rule 11 sanctions by voluntarily dismissing the
suit.3 23
315. The court was quick to point out however that "[t]his is of course not so when the
'other causes' include factors that are internal to plaintiff or general in the market." Id.
(citing Eastern Auto Distrib. v. Peugeot Motors, 795 F.2d 329, 338 (4th Cir. 1986)).
316. Omni, 891 F.2d at 1144-45 n.8.
317. 1'990-1 Trade Cases (CCH) T 68,992 (U.S. April 17, 1990). See also the companion
case Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 1990-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 1 68,992
(U.S. April 17, 1990).
318. The parties' dispute concerned two days of interest. While seemingly insignificant, a
multimillion dollar antitrust award may amass thousands of dollars of interest a day. Kai-
ser, 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,992 at 63,432.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 63,444.
322. 58 U.S.L.W. 4763 (U.S. June 11, 1990). The Court also ruled that an appellate court
should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing all aspects of a District Court's
Rule 11 determination. Finally, the Court held that a party is not subject, under Rule 11, to
pay the other party's expenses incurred in defending a Rule 11 award on appeal. Rather, the
Court held that Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure governs this issue. Id.
323. Id. at 4767.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
III. VIRGINIA ATTORNEY GENERAL CIVIL ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
The Antitrust and Consumer Litigation Section of the Attorney
General's Office concluded two antitrust matters over the last year.
A. Consumer Electronics Settlement Approved
This past year, the Virginia Attorney General's Office, along with
the Attorneys General of forty-eight other states and the District
of Columbia, entered into a settlement agreement with the
Panasonic Company, a division of Matsushita Electric Corporation
of America, resulting from an investigation of resale price mainte-
nance violations.
Panasonic traditionally issued with its list of wholesale prices a
suggested range of retail sales prices. According to allegations con-
tained in the complaint accompanying the settlement agreement,
in early 1988, Panasonic initiated a new policy whereby it began to
issue another suggested retail list price that it referred to as the
"Go price," which was that price below which no retailer was ex-
pected to sell. The "Go price" did not appear on any of
Panasonic's price sheets and was given to retailers verbally. "Go
pricing" was a major effort by Panasonic to maintain prices on va-
rious Panasonic and Technics brand items while Panasonic was
also attempting to introduce a uniform price to dealers. The stated
policy of Panasonic in initiating the new "Go price" was to reduce
the confusion over their pricing schedule and to increase the prof-
itability of both Panasonic and its retailers.
The investigation centered on sixteen specified Panasonic and/or
Technics products during that time period, including VCR's,
camcorders, telephones, answering machines and stereo equipment.
The settlement terms, which were filed in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York and approved on
February 5, 1990, called for consumer refunds to purchasers of the
sixteen products between March 1 and August 31, 1988. The
amount of refund per customer ranged from seventeen dollars to
forty-five dollars depending on the product and model purchased.
Nationwide figures revealed that 665,121 consumers were affected
by the settlement, with consumers in Virginia alone totaling be-
tween 15,000 and 20,000.
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B. Business Review Procedure
The Engineers and Surveyors Institute ("ESI") obtained, pursu-
ant to the Virginia Antitrust Act Business Review Procedure, a
statement that the Attorney General had no current enforcement
intentions with respect to proposed conduct involving certain lob-
bying and petitioning activity. The ESI's goal was the implementa-
tion of a peer review program operated and organized by ESI, a
nonprofit Virginia corporation formed by professional engineers
and surveyors in 1987 to improve and represent the development
engineering and surveying professions in the Northern Virginia
area.
IV. STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES
The Virginia General Assembly amended and reenacted sections
of title 38.2 of the Code of Virginia, which address anticompetitive
activity by liability insurers, and added provisions for Attorney
General civil investigations of suspected violations, and injunctive
and restitutionary relief for both the Commonwealth and victims
of violations." 4 The Virginia Gas and Coal Act placed pooling of
interests by the owners of gas or oil wells beyond statutory or com-
mon law restrictions on "monopolies or acts, arrangements, con-
tracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade or com-
merce." 325 The legislature also expanded the negative consequences
of an antitrust conviction by requiring waste management facilities
to include antitrust convictions of key personnel in disclosure
statements to the Department of Waste Management326 and
amended the provisions defining advertising practices forbidden to
motor vehicle dealers.32 7
V. FEDERAL REGULATORY AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
A. Civil Enforcement
1. Litigation
In addition to the Carilion merger litigation, the Antitrust Divi-
sion issued civil investigative demands to a number of Virginia pri-
324. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-1916.1, -1916.2 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
325. See id. § 45.1-361.18(B) (Cur. Supp. 1990).
326. See id. § 10.1-1400(5) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
327. See id. § 46.2-1581 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
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vate colleges and universities as part of a national investigation
into tuition, fees, and salary practices. 28
2. Depart of Justice Business Review Procedure
Under this procedure, an entity may submit a proposed business
activity to the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice for
its review and receive a determination of whether the Antitrust Di-
vision would challenge the proposed activity as an antitrust
violation.32 9
The Antitrust Division issued a Business Review letter to Hamp-
ton Roads Examination Warehouse, Inc. ("HREW") regarding a
proposed joint venture between five Hampton Roads warehouse
companies to establish and operate an off-terminal central exami-
nation station for United States Customs Service review of cargo
entering the United States. 330 The joint venture proposal resulted
from a Customs Service decision to change its practice of con-
ducting cargo inspections at four terminals and conduct those in-
spections only at one terminal location and an additional off-termi-
nal site. The Antitrust Division raised three competitive concerns
regarding the joint venture. First, it noted that the joint venturers
could obtain benefits, in the nature of preferential cargo handling,
over non-owner warehouse companies which could constitute a
competitive disadvantage to the non-owner warehouses and ulti-
mately may result in market power for the owners. Recognizing,
however, that the Customs Service requires non-discriminatory
cargo treatment, this concern was minimized. The Division's sec-
ond concern, regarding the disclosure of confidential information,
such as customer lists, to the non-owner, was eliminated by
HREW's representation that no information exchange between
joint ventures would transpire. The Division's final concern of col-
lusion between the joint venturers on related services was obviated
by the limited scope of the joint venture.
328. "Investigation Into Tuition Fixing Spreads; 55 Institutions Now Say They Are
Targets," The Chronicle of Higher Education, October 4, 1989.
329. 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1990).
330. Letter from James F. Rill, Assistant Attorney General of the United States to
HREW (Nov. 20, 1989) (Westlaw, FABR-BRL database).
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3. Federal Trade Commission Activities
The FTC was also active in Virginia during the past year. In
Matter of Metro MLS, Inc.,331 the FTC obtained a consent order
against a large real estate multiple listing service in Tidewater
which had prohibited publication of exclusive agency listings. An
exclusive agency listing is a brokerage service contract where the
property owner agrees to pay a commission if the property is sold
through a broker, but only a reduced commission or no commission
at all if the owner locates the purchaser.33 2 The FTC complaint,
charging a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act,3 3 alleged that the policy unreasonably restrained competition:
(a) by restraining competition among brokerage firms based on will-
ingness to offer or accept different contract terms that may be at-
tractive and beneficial to consumers; (b) by limiting the ability of
consumers to negotiate brokerage contract terms that may be more
advantageous to them than an exclusive right to sell listing; and (c)
by limiting the ability of property sellers to compete against real
estate brokers in locating purchasers. 3"
The proposed consent order prevents the listing service from refus-
ing publications of any exclusive agency listing. 335
In In re Hensley Group,336 the FTC obtained a consent order,
pursuant to section 5 of the FTC Act, against an Alexandria, Vir-
ginia timeshare property promoter prohibiting it from representing
to consumers that they had won prizes when in fact they had not
won such a prize, or that free prizes would be given when, in fact,
such prizes bore charges. The FTC had earlier obtained a prelimi-
nary injunction against the Hensley Group and another timeshare
resort operator, the Defuscos 37
The FTC also commented on proposed Virginia legislation and
regulations, counseling in each instance that the proposals may in-
331. No. 881-0044 (October 12, 1989) (Westlaw, FABR-FTC database).
332. Id.
333. 15 U.SC. § 45 (1988). Section 5 of the FTC Act provides that "[u]nfair methods of
competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful." Id.
334. Metro, No. 881-0044, Westlaw at 9-10.
335. Id.
336. 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 22,716 (E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 1989).
337. FTC v. Defusco, No. 89-1046 (E.D. Va. filed August 4, 1989).
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hibit competition.3 8 Responding to a proposed Virginia Board of
Pharmacy regulation authorizing physicians to dispense and sell
prescription drugs, the FTC Bureau of Competition opined that
dispensing of prescription drugs by practitioners "provides service
and price competition among physicians and between physicians
and pharmacists, which are likely to benefit consumers." The FTC
expressed concern over a requirement in the regulation that the
dispensing physician personally perform the "selection, com-
pounding, preparation, packaging and labeling of a prescription
drug," opining that this requirement would unnecessarily restrict
physicians' dispensing, thus reducing competition and consumer
choice. In so opining, the FTC noted that existing Virginia phar-
macy regulations do not require such comprehensive personal in-
volvement by pharmacists. The FTC also commented negatively
on a Virginia legislative proposal placing restrictions on gasoline
suppliers vis-a-vis gasoline dealers, suggesting that such restraints
may lessen competition among dealers and cause an increase in
prices.
B. Criminal Enforcement
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice was again
active in its enforcement efforts in Virginia this year.
In United States v. Franzen,3 39 the Fourth Circuit upheld the
conviction of an executive of a chain link fence manufacturer de-
spite the arguments raised on appeal that the executive had no
knowledge of and had not participated in the conspiracy.340 In re-
viewing the jury verdict, the Fourth Circuit applied the substantial
evidence standard, framing the issue as whether "any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime be-
yond a reasonable doubt."3' As to the knowledge requirement,
338. Letter from Kevin J. Arquit, Director, FTC Bureau of Competition to Virginia Board
of Pharmacy (Nov. 27, 1989) (Westlaw, FABR-FTC database); Letter from Kevin J. Arquit,
Director, FTC Bureau of Competition to Virginia General Assembly (Mar. 2, 1990)
(Westlaw, FABR-FTC database).
339. 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 68,693 (4th Cir. 1989).
340. In a criminal conspiracy action, the government must prove, by either direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence, that the alleged conspirator "knew the purpose of the conspiracy and
that he participated in it as evidenced by the taking of some action in furtherance of the
object of the conspiracy." Id. at 61,640 (citing United States v. Loughman, 618 F.2d 1067,
1075 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980)).
341. Franzen, 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,693 at 61,640 (quoting Loughman, 618 F.2d
at 1075).
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while Franzen contended that the government proved only that he
was aware of meetings held between his subordinate and admitted
conspirator, Bruce J. Patrick, and not that the meetings were to fix
prices, the court cited testimony that Franzen knew the meetings
were to discuss prices and had expressed pleasure that the meet-
ings had gone well and documentary evidence of ending the previ-
ous practice of stealing other manufacturers accounts with low
prices as evidence supporting the jury verdict. 42 Franzen also ar-
gued against upholding his conviction because he never met with
competitors to fix prices.3 43 The court held such a meeting not to
be necessary to sustain a conviction, however, noting that authoriz-
ing, ordering or helping perpetuate the crime is sufficient to make
one a participant in a price fixing conspiracy. " Determining that
the record established that "in numerous instances Franzen au-
thorized actions necessary to the carrying out of the conspiracy,3 45
the court affirmed the conviction.
The Antitrust Division also prosecuted a soft drink bottling firm
and two former executives for conspiracy to defraud the govern-
ment.3 4 That case, which arose out of a grand jury investigation of
price fixing among soft drink bottlers, was tried in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia and resulted in a $1.8 million fine against the
bottler.
The Antitrust Division also conducted an extensive grand jury
investigation into the advertising practices of Roanoke and Lynch-
burg television stations, which did not result in indictment.3 47 Fi-
nally, Attorney General Mary Sue Terry has requested the Anti-
trust Division to mount an investigation into the bidding practices
of Virginia dairies regarding school milk pricing, following similar
342. Franzen 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68, 693 at 61,640-41.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 61,641 (citing United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 416 (1962)). The Franzen
court noted that "[a] single act will suffice to show participation if the circumstances permit
the inference that the act was intended to advance the ends of the conspiracy." Franzen,
1989-2 Trade Cas. at 61,641 (citing United States v. Vega, 860 F.2d 779, 795 (7th Cir. 1988)).
345. Franzen, 1989-2 Trade Cas. at 61,641. The government's evidence of authorization
consisted of Franzen's approval of Patrick's meetings with competitors, to discuss "the an-
nual price increase. . . the two tier price system. . . charging freight, and. . . stopping the
price war . . . ." Franzen's authorization of Patrick's successful efforts to get a competitor
to stop price cutting; and the issuance of a price increase that had been the subject of prior
conspiratorial meetings of which Franzen was aware. Id. at 61,641.
346. United States v. Mid-Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc., No. 90-27-N (E.D. Va.
1990).
347. TV Investigation Halted, Roanoke Times & World News, April 27, 1990.
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government investigations in Florida and Georgia. 48
VI. CONCLUSION
Antitrust claims remain difficult to prosecute and prove. Within
the past year, the courts have consistently demanded substantial,
factual allegations supporting the major elements of an antitrust
claim. In considering the merits of a claim, they have carefully
scrutinized both the evidence offered to establish the existence of
an alleged conspiracy and the market definition proposed by the
plaintiff. In cases involving price discrimination, tying, and monop-
olization, and in evaluating plaintiffs' requests for preliminary in-
junctions, the courts have shown little tendency to stretch their
substantive definitions or their evidentiary requirements. One case
suggests that plaintiffs may find it easier to escape state action or
Noerr-Pennington immunity by characterizing local government
actions as conspiracies or shams, respectively; however, other cases
suggest no changes in the prevailing analysis. The apparent adop-
tion of the market screen analysis by the Fourth Circuit suggests
that yet another threshold burden will plague plaintiffs bringing
antitrust claims. The United States Supreme Court, while making
it clear that the remedy of divestiture is available to successful pri-
vate plaintiffs, has also increased the burden on private plaintiffs
by extending the indirect purchaser rule to cases involving regu-
lated industries and by requiring plaintiffs to show antitrust injury
even when a per se vertical, maximum price fixing violation has
occurred.
348. The Washington Post, April 28, 1990, at B1, col.6.
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